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The Editors
AS WE WERE
SAYING IN 1935

ONE DOLLAR

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

AFTER IRAN & AFGHANISTAN

The editors, Abigail McCarthy, and Thomas Powers (pages 67, 72, 73)

HOSTAGES IN THEIR HOMELAND

The struggle of Lithuania's Catholics

RICHARD J. KRICKUS

MINING & UNDERMINING

What state enforcement promises to do to the federal strip-mini... 85

Protestants, too have a large stake in what it means to be Catholic and the way the pope, as bishop of Rome, presents Christ to the world and to the churches. Many are disturbed when the pope speaks as if no other significant body of Christian experience and thinking exists.

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PROTESTANTS & THE POPE

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Correspondence

Saints & scholars

Boston, Mass.

To the Editors: In your brief commentary, "A Secular Saint" [Nov. 23], on Mother Teresa as recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and the subsequent editorial on this event in the *New York Times*, I at first had the same reactions that you had in this regard.

However, in simmering on it for awhile, it occurred to me that the "secular" refers not to Mother Teresa but to the origins of the award itself—in short, a saint chosen by secularists. Therefore, a saint for all secularists, and one as deserving such popular recognition as she has inspired.

Also, may I commend the perceptive book reviews [Nov. 9] by Pheme Perkins on Elaine H. Pagels's *The Gnostic Gospels* and by Maureen Mullarkey on Germaine Greer's *The Obstacle*, These are absolutely first-rate reviews, I think, especially in their having penetrated with such sound scholarship the very specialized feminist interests at which many reviewers, ostensibly, would have stopped first in order to serve that preferred purpose.

THOMAS P. McDONNELL
Book Editor, *The Pilot*

A venial scenario?

Rome

To the Editors: It takes a long time for *Commonweal* to work its way through the maze of the Italian postal system. So I have only just received the Aug. 31 number which contained Richard P. McBrien's comparative review of two books on the 1978 conclaves, one by A.M. Greeley and the other by myself. I am grateful for his discriminating remarks.

There is one myth, however, that I would like to dispel, especially since a commentator has ironically suggested that it was my major contribution to the study of the conclaves. I never predicted that Bertoli would become pope at the seventh ballot, as McBrien suggests, following Greeley. In the latter's column this later became "the prediction in black headlines all over the English newspapers that Paolo Bertoli was going to be elected pope." Now I don't know what color Greeley expects headlines to be; and I don't know what he means by "all over the English newspapers." The fact is that in *one* article in *The Sunday Times* I offered a *possible scenario* in which, with the conclave deadlocked, a compromise candidate, such as *for example* Bertoli, might emerge. So I do not propose to don the penitent's robes for that 'mistake.' It was not a bad description of the *process* which led to the election of Wojtyla the second time round.

One minor issue, I do not believe that my preoccupation with Cardinal Basil Hume is to be put on the same level as Greeley's obsession with Cardinal John J. Cody, nor do I think it evidence of "provincialism." I happen to like Hume. I quoted him not for that reason, but because he is eminently quotable.

PETER HEBBLETHWAITE

Kazakhs, Uzbeks, et al.

Ann Arbor, Mich.

To the Editors: George Liber [Nov. 23] draws attention to the shifting ethnic balance within the Soviet Union. Some clarifications are in order.

It is almost certainly true that the Muslim peoples of Soviet Central Asia continue to multiply more rapidly than the Soviet Slavs. However, the first results of the January, 1979 Soviet census provide no firm data on this. These returns give population only by administrative units, not by nationality. There is a significant difference.

The total population of the six Soviet Muslim Union Republics was 38 million in 1970; but the six native peoples of those Republics numbered only 24 million. Most of the other inhabitants are Russian, and strongly identify as such. Russian migrants are especially dominant in the cities: the Kazakh capital, Alma-Ata, is only 12 percent Kazakh in population (1970).

We don't yet know how much of Central Asia's population growth in the seventies came from migration, and how much from natural increase. (In the sixties, both factors were important). We should note, though, that growth has slowed—for whatever reason—in every Soviet Muslim Republic. Declining native birth rates are one likely factor.

No demographer I know expects the Uzbeks *et al.* to triple their present (1979) numbers by the year 2000. That would require over 5 percent annual growth, whereas Liber admits that even the recent rate (between 3 and 4 percent) is "phenomenal."

Nonetheless, the Muslim birth rate is likely to exceed that of the Russians for some time to come. Liber points out some important possible consequences. Allow me to add that the growing surplus of rural Muslim labor has two possible outlets: either to Russia (which is now short of labor), or to Central Asian cities. "Recapture" by the Muslims of their own cities is a prerequisite for modern nationhood.

Natural growth rates and migration patterns will both be worth watching, when fuller census data become available.

JOSEPH D. McCADDEN

Rethinking jobs

Albuquerque, N.M.

To the Editors: The Chrysler dilemma ["Should We Bail Chrysler Out?", Nov. 9] is one that Jonathan Swift would appreciate and that John Maynard Keynes foresaw. The single disaster that no one predicts from a Chrysler collapse is a critical shortage of cars. We already have quite a few cars, with more on the way.

(Continued on page 95)

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CARTER, KENNEDY & AFGHANISTAN

"The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the second World War."
—President Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23

"Exaggeration and hyperbole are the enemies of sensible foreign policy."
—Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Georgetown Address, January 28

"This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action—not only for this year, but for many years to come." —President Carter

IT WOULD BE BETTER for all of us if the debate over Afghanistan could be conducted within the framework of these warnings. President Carter and Senator Kennedy have been cast as antagonists in this debate, but in fact, despite their significant differences, both have addressed the foreign policy issues posed by Afghanistan far more responsibly than numerous voices to their left and right. The left is rightly fearful of a new Cold War and traditionally skeptical of the demands for greater armament and military "preparedness." But some voices in these ranks are making excuses: the U.S. provoked the Soviet action by urging Pershing missiles on NATO. . . . Moscow was removing a fanatical Afghan Pol Pot (not that much had been said in these quarters about that fanaticism before the invasion). . . . The Russians were doing no more than the U.S. has frequently done (although such interventions by the U.S. were previously considered outrageous). Others, trying to offset belligerent interpretations by hard-liners, have emphasized elements, like Moscow's fears for its borders, its own Moslem population, or its traditional prestige in Kabul, that suggest this is a limited, regional episode, not a major challenge to Western security. These critics do have some valid points, but one is left with two nagging questions: What evidence, if any, would they accept of a serious Soviet threat? And what, given the drawbacks of various Western countermeasures, do they propose be done—except carry on as though absolutely nothing had happened?

The public, in any case, is in no mood for such arguments. It has married the Afghan question with the Iran imbroglio as a general indication of failing U.S. strength. It doesn't realize that American "weakness" vis à vis Teheran is largely of our own choosing. We *want* to keep the hostages alive. We do *not* want to create further chaos in a nation bordering on the U.S.S.R. It is our own set of policy priorities that stay our hand toward Iran.

But the public's mood of frustration makes it a ripe target for the *simplificateurs* of the right. For them, the world is always on the brink of a Munich. The Soviet Union is more than a great power pursuing interests and influence; it is unmitigatedly expansionist, on the model of Nazi Germany. The only prescription, urged by such

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commentators since the mid-forties, is more arms, alliances with anti-Soviet regimes regardless of their domestic character, and a strong stomach, virtually an eagerness, for confrontation. They want a new Cold War, and for them the Afghan invasion has been a gift horse.

According to this outlook, the U.S. has been suffering from "post-Vietnam syndrome": our leadership is so afflicted with "guilt" that it has been unwilling to assert American interests and wield American power. This is a caricature. The Carter administration did try to construct a foreign policy that absorbed the "lessons of Vietnam," but it had nothing to do with guilt or an abandonment of U.S. interests. That policy could be outlined under four headings:

U.S.-Soviet relations. Conflict between the two superpowers was still a reality. But a concern with the Soviets would no longer dominate American policy to the near exclusion of everything else. The world was multipolar, not bipolar. More attention ought to be given to other matters in their own right: the Mideast, ties with Europe and Japan, economic questions.

Third World. An extended period of social change and political turmoil would engulf the developing nations. The U.S. should have confidence in the long-run attractiveness of democracy, but we should recognize the impossibility of controlling the many twists and turns, advances and reverses of immature and insecure regimes throughout the world.

Human rights. Both the influence of the U.S. abroad and the legitimacy and popularity of its foreign policy at home would be strengthened by public commitment and diplomatic pressure on behalf of human rights and freedom. This policy, it was recognized from the start, would entail compromises, but to therefore relinquish the cause of human rights altogether would be to relinquish America's special claim to moral authority.

Arms limitation: The strategic arms race should be countered through SALT. Obstacles should be established to nuclear proliferation and restraints put on the sale of conventional weaponry.

The administration did not always live up to this policy. It failed to exercise control over conventional arms sales. It did better by nuclear proliferation and SALT. Its human rights policy was often obscured by ineffective rhetoric but has, nonetheless, restored American prestige and unsettled dictatorships in parts of Latin America and Africa. Its assumptions about multipolarity and the Third World do not appear any less true today than three years ago.

The problem, of course, is with the general deemphasis on the Soviet challenge. A rising Soviet military budget and an apparent willingness to act directly or through proxies beyond Russian borders have forced the administration, step by step, to retreat from this premise. Does Afghanistan mean that now it should turn about-face and make the threat of Russian expansion the preoccupying and controlling element in foreign policy?

The answer, unfortunately, doesn't come wrapped in a handy slogan.

On the one hand, it does seem that the Russian thrust into Afghanistan is a limited action, sufficiently motivated by Moscow's unwillingness to tolerate a dramatic reversal of a Communist regime. (It is an ironic fact that history shows no one in as much danger from Russian power as Communist rulers.) Talk of warm-water ports and the Straits of Hormuz seem to exaggerate Soviet intentions.

On the other hand, intentions aren't everything. Whatever led Russia into Afghanistan in the first place, it now has the strategic capacity for all kinds of destabilizing actions, and some of them, like incursions into Pakistan or the backing of Baluchi rebels, may flow almost automatically from the pressure of events. Although a move toward the Persian Gulf might always have meant out-and-out war, President Carter was right to make this unmistakably clear: miscalculation is the seedbed of catastrophe. Similar clarity between the two nations about Yugoslavia ought to be obtained on short order.

Senator Kennedy was himself engaging in hyperbole when he said at Georgetown that Afghanistan had, in any case, "passed behind the Iron Curtain, not in 1980, but in 1978." But in many ways Kennedy's admonitions were useful qualifications rather than blunt contradictions to the president's position. Kennedy criticized the administration sharply for its lack of consistent concentration on Soviet actions, both in Afghanistan and Cuba; but he also warned that Afghanistan should not fill up the entire horizon of American attention—in short, a restatement of the original Carter foreign policy. Kennedy seconded the emphasis on conventional arms in the area, but urged that arms control not be abandoned or that irrelevant strategic weapons systems not be illogically linked to defense of the Persian Gulf area. Most importantly, Kennedy renewed the link between international and domestic policy. The fact is that Carter's earlier foreign policy, as set forth at Notre Dame in May 1977, for example, was based on "confidence" in our way of life—and this confidence has been sapped less by Soviet adventures than by our own inability to devise new policies to deal with inflation, unemployment, and energy. To govern is to choose; and despite Kennedy's image as the candidate of expansive government, he was warning that America could not have all the conventional forces it needed without thinking twice about new missile systems, that we could not risk war or in effect call for sacrifices by the young or the poor without risking strong measures for controlling energy consumption and inflation or demanding sacrifices from banks and corporations.

There are choices, of course, that neither Kennedy nor the president dealt with, and the outstanding one is the question of arming General Zia and mortgaging our future to what is an insecure and murderous minority government. Selig Harrison, in the *Washington Post*, has argued that military aid to Zia, which in any event may provoke further hostilities with India, should be tied to internal reform. That, alas, has the ring of Vietnam-era wishful thinking. Our plunge toward Pakistan, like the pressures for "unleashing" the CIA, seem precipitous. We've been this way before.

"A war atmosphere has been created," writes George F. Kennan. "Never since World War II has there been so far-

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reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the capital." That cannot be blamed on the administration alone. It is the product of an effective campaign by veteran Cold Warriors, of the crisis in Iran, and of the Soviets' policy too. In some ways, and not always skillfully, President Carter has tried to moderate the mood. He'd better try harder, even if it means standing up for several of the sensible principles he enunciated at the beginning of his term.

REPEATING OURSELVES

"With hindsight," Cyrus Vance said recently, recalling the 1936 Olympics in Nazi Germany, he wished the United States had not participated. In this case, *Commonweal* can claim credit for more than good hindsight. On December 13, 1935, in an editorial subsequently reported on the first page of the *New York Times*, *Commonweal* argued that "for every Catholic, or Protestant, or Jew, or believer in the inviolable dignity of the human personality, the trip to Germany unwittingly made in 1936 is bound to mean regret and even torment in later years. For to have given aid and comfort to the enemy, however unconsciously, must remain forever a thorn in the side of a brave man."

We believe that the same reasoning applies to the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

Much as we may regret it, the Olympic Games are highly politicized, and to play host to them is a specifically political triumph. Hitler used the Games cynically to establish his regime's international respectability, mere months after his invasion of the Rhineland. Rolf Pauls, the West German ambassador to NATO, startled his own government recently by suggesting that "if the world had boycotted Hitler's 1936 Olympics, the course of history might have been different." In America we tend to remember Jesse Owens, the black American who triumphed over his German opponents and over the theory of their Aryan superiority. But in the European context, as a State Department official has said, "Jesse Owens was a footnote."

Likewise any winning American athlete will be no more than a footnote to the massive Russian image-building already underway. Unembarrassed by anything so stupidly vulnerable as the Nazi racial theories, Russia will present itself to the world as the benign and gracious host of a festival of sport, as fun-loving and downright cute as its Teddy-bear Olympic mascot. This after Andrei Sakharov and who knows how many other potential troublemakers have been shipped out of town. There is simply no way our athletes can avoid conniving at this, no matter how far that might be from their thoughts or wishes. Connivance will be enforced by the very conventions of sportsmanlike behavior.

The argument that a boycott will unfairly penalize our athletes has merit. True, some of them are in it simply for the money they will make blessing deodorant soaps and jogging shorts with their winner's smiles (and some have been feckless enough to say so). But it would be wrong to simplify matters by regarding them as typical. Better to acknowledge that the typical Olympic athlete has struggled toward an honorable goal only to have it snatched from him or her at the last moment.

What we can say to such a person is that sacrifices are never distributed fairly, and yet they sometimes must be made. To take only the most obvious example, think of the young man of good health in a time of war. If this argument brings only cold comfort, there is the other argument that we made in 1935. Years from now the pageantry and conviviality and the innocent striving of sport may look hollow and false in the light of what was happening in Afghanistan. The memory may well prove a thorn in the side. Recent comments by American participants in the 1936 Olympics show that for many of them our warning was prophetic.

Of course, moving the Olympics would obviate the sacrifice and disappointment. But this will probably be impossible because the Olympics have assumed such mastodonic proportions. They take years to settle their weight anywhere and years to move again, and, for all the glory they bring with them, they frequently leave local economies flattened. The current controversy over the Moscow Olympics has focused attention on this more general issue, and brought forth some interesting suggestions. Perhaps they might be permanently located in Greece or a neutral country or two. Perhaps—and we like this idea better—their several events could be scattered across the world. That way more people would see some heroes and heroines in the flesh, while images of the rest bounced off satellites to the whole world. Decentralized and stripped to running shoes and shorts, the games would become as sinewy and lithe as their participants.

Report from Venezuela

VENEZUCOMMUNISM

LEARNING THE LESSON OF CHILE?

IT'S A LONG WAY from Caracas to Rome, but the largest group in Venezuela's leftist bloc has combined some Italian Eurocommunist themes with an originality of its own. The Movimiento al Socialismo 'MAS) proposes a "Venezuelan Road to Socialism" which retains the nation's constitution and the pre-existing democratic structure. The party promises to maintain a pluralistic society and to turn over the reins of power to any non-socialist group that manages to secure a majority of votes. MAS has worked diligently to popularize the idea of socialism in a campaign which clearly shows the mark of Antonio Gramsci, the ideological mentor of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). This strategy of winning over the general populace to socialism arose out of the trauma of military defeat in the 1960s; at that time the Venezuelan Communist Party, from which MAS later emerged, attempted to impose radical solutions on the nation through guerrilla

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warfare, and even carried out sabotage in an effort to impede presidential elections.

Both MAS and the Italian Communists have confronted the formidable problem of trying to influence a polarized electorate which fails to provide the left with its sought-for majority. The PCI, for its part, came up with the proposal of the "historic compromise" whereby Communists would share power—rather than compete for it—with the ruling Christian Democrats. For MAS, the answer lies in breaking away from what it calls a leftist "ghetto" of time-worn formulas and rhetoric which are alien to the majority of Venezuelans. MAS has even considered eliminating the words "leftist" and "rightist" from its vocabulary in order to cut down on the tendency of political stereotyping. Most importantly, the party has devised a "transitional" program based on mass participation in decision-making at all levels, a plan which is designed to appeal to large numbers of people of non-socialist persuasion.

The overthrow of the government of Salvador Allende in 1973 raised serious doubts about the feasibility of democratic socialism and spurred the PCI and MAS to embark upon their newborn strategies. Since then, MAS leaders have criticized Allende for having precipitated a confrontation before his government had won over a majority to its side. They maintain that Allende should have offered ample guarantees to small and medium-size companies rather than sanctioning their takeovers by workers. The MASistas deny that the moderate-oriented Chilean Christian Democrats adopted a position of unqualified resistance to the government which ruled out the possibility of arriving at an understanding with them, as some have contended. At any rate, MAS sees in the Chilean experience that which has often occurred in other historical circumstances: the shadow of a previous revolution—in this case that of Cuba—hung over the nation, distorting reality for leftists who were all too disposed to accept preconceived notions.

Communists in Italy, France and Spain have considered entering into alliances with parties to their right, whereas MAS has chosen the option of allying itself with groups considerably to its left. Up until recently, MASistas had ruled out such a pact for fear that it would blur the democratic image which they were trying to project. As a result, however, MAS candidates suffered a series of reversals in student and trade union elections to rivals who defended unity of the left. In the recent municipal elections, the united left drew 18 percent of the votes, double the intake of four individual leftist presidential candidates just six months earlier. The Venezuelan electorate has thus given MAS a mandate to put aside its reserves and line up with other parties on the left; the oft-heard commentary—frequently voiced in Europe as well—is, as long as those favoring socialism do not get together, they cannot be considered *serious* contenders and thus do not deserve to be elected.

If unity is to mean anything in the long run, the leftist parties will have to come to terms with their outstanding differences. This is no ordinary task. The orthodox Marxist parties accuse MAS of shying away from the struggle for socio-economic change in order to maintain a respectable image. In fact some claim that MAS's defense of small and medium-size enterprises is but a throwback to the days of competitive capitalism. Nevertheless, many of MAS's leftist critics have acknowledged the party's electoral successes by modifying their own stands and copying MAS's style. Given these developments on the Venezuelan left, Eurocommunism can no longer be considered a purely European phenomenon. STEVE ELLNER

(Steve Ellner is a member of the faculty at the Universidad de Oriente in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela.)

Canadian elections

TEST FOR THE TORIES

MASSACRE OF THE INNOCENTS

WHEN PRIME MINISTER Joe Clark assumed office last spring, with 136 seats, his conservative minority government faced a combined opposition of 146 seats. Of these he could expect to count on the support of six Social Credit members from Quebec, giving the minority government an edge of three seats if, as expected, the incumbent Liberal speaker of the house were retained by the new government. There was no coalition; the Socreds affirmed that they would judge each vote on its merits and act accordingly.

The day after the elections Joe Clark proclaimed to the nation and the world that—with 36 percent of the popular vote—he had a mandate to govern Canada and that he would govern as if he had a majority government. In other words, there would be no formal consultation with any of the opposition parties. They would go it alone.

The dicey arithmetic of parliamentary government assumed new complexities as Parliament was finally convened early in October. One Social Credit member crossed the floor to join the conservatives, giving them one more seat and leaving a less-than-benign feeling for the Tories among the remaining Socreds. Poaching is allowed, but poachers must be prepared to take the consequences. In November by-elections the New Democratic Party took the seat left by the late John G. Diefenbaker and the Liberals retained two others without difficulty. Routine motions of non-confidence by the NDP and the Liberals were as routinely defeated as a sufficient number of Liberals were conveniently absent. It would not be politic to turf out the new government without giving them a chance.

The first real test was the budget, due to be brought down in December. During the election campaign the Tories had made a number of specific promises. They would get rid of Petrocan—Canada's public-sector petroleum company—move the Canadian Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, make mortgage interest payments deductible for income tax purposes, cut taxes and government spending.

By the time of the budget the attack on Petrocan had for the moment been tabled, the Embassy in Israel remained in Tel

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Aviv, the deductibility of mortgage interest had been moved to the other end of the tax form as a tax credit limited, for next year, to three-hundred and seventy-five dollars, interest rates had gone up to over fifteen percent, governmental spending had in fact increased and tax increases required to pay for mortgage tax credits for homeowners and reduce the federal deficit were calculated by Herb Gray, Liberal finance critic, at 39 percent for most people and 30 percent for homeowners.

The Gallup poll reported 47 percent for the Liberals. 27 percent for the Tories, and 24 percent for the NDP. Mr. Clark continued to govern as if he had a majority.

The budget, aimed at restoring the country's economy after sixteen years of Liberal government, was "realistic" and "tough." It promised high interest rates, higher unemployment, double-digit inflation, higher taxes and higher premiums for unemployment insurance. The higher taxes, laid on in the interest of conservation and energy self-sufficiency, included a whopping eighteen cents per gallon increase in excise tax on gasoline and increased federal excise taxes on booze and cigarettes. The Tories clearly intended to stick to one of their most sacred principles: that money should stay in the hands of the rich, who can be trusted to use it in a responsible manner.

The increase in premiums for unemployment insurance also appealed to the conservative devotion to the supply and demand models of classical economics. Since their budget guaranteed a greater demand for unemployment insurance, the price would go up.

The abrupt increase in gasoline prices was too much for the five remaining Socred members, all from rural Quebec districts. As the vote on the budget approached they announced that they would abstain. With three Tories absent from the House, two Liberals brought in from the hospital for the vote and only one Liberal absent, the result was a vote of 139 to 133 against the government. Even had the Socreds voted with the government, it would not have been enough.

The elections have been called for February 18, which is a bad time for elections in Canada. Across the country, people are still trying to figure out just what happened. Petulant Tories cried "foul" and complained that they were not given a chance to govern. Some commentators spoke of a sort of creeping madness, the unleashing of inexorable forces, of events beyond the control of the participants. The government blames the opposition for forcing winter elections; the opposition blames the government for bringing down a budget that no serious opposition could live with.

Whether the budget was deliberately provocative, or whether the Tories in all innocence really thought they could get away with it is still an open question. In either case, they had no choice at all but to campaign on that budget. Their platform was presented to Parliament and the nation the week of December 10, debated in televised sessions in Parliament for three days and defeated in the Commons the night of December 13.

It could be as exciting as the last elections were dull: we are to be treated to the rare spectacle of a major political party going to the country on a platform of higher taxes, higher unemployment, higher inflation, all justified in the name of deferred gratification.

For the Tories it is very much a matter of principle. Whatever happens to the economy in the short run, the budget deficit must be reduced. Had their government survived, the budget would have represented a wager that Mr. Carter would not allow a recession in an election year in the United States. The Canadian economy is very sensitive to changes in the U.S. economy, and things are already slow. Yet even the need to reduce the budgetary deficit was not enough to force them to abandon their vote-catching Christmas present to homeowners: a tax-credit plan for mortgage interest and property taxes. This was attacked by opposition members because it discriminates against people living in rental housing, because it is to be financed by even more regressive taxation, and because it takes money from the poor to give to the well-to-do.

The Tories insist that we have been living beyond our means and that we must reform. The people wanted a change from the free-spending Liberals and they will get it.

As the campaign began the Liberals were without a leader, Mr. Trudeau having announced his resignation in November. This may in fact have convinced the Tories that they could get away with a budget that no intelligent minority government would normally have considered. At the time of Mr. Trudeau's resignation a leadership convention was scheduled for March of 1980 and everyone agreed that this effectively put off any talk of elections until after the new Liberal leader had been chosen. When the budget was defeated, there was talk of a special leadership convention in January, but the Liberals, after a fairly intensive consultation, asked Mr. Trudeau to stay on to fight the elections.

All this complicates matters considerably. There is little doubt that in the elections of last May the Tories won their minority government on a vote that was anti-Trudeau rather than pro-Clark. There is in fact a long tradition in Canadian politics of voting "against" someone or something rather than voting "for" a leader or a platform. The New Democratic Party appears to be moving towards a campaign that appeals to this sentiment: that it is time for a *real* change.

As the campaign opened Mr. Clark seemed to feel that the NDP were a real danger. It could be argued that their unexpected good showing in the West deprived the Tories of a majority in May. In a style that has become traditional with British Columbia Social Credit politicians, he refused to refer to the NDP by name. For this campaign, they were to be "the socialists." For Western Tories and Socreds (ideologically, there is not much difference between them), this is a nasty thing to say, just as a socialist is a nasty thing to be.

Hardly anyone dares to make a prediction. Some Tories, cheered by the fact that Mr. Trudeau will come back from a retirement that had not yet become effective, foresee a repeat of last May's elections, a personality contest between Trudeau and Clark, with the hope that the budget might get lost in the shuffle. Most observers agree that in one key element the elections will indeed be very much like the May elections: they

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will be decided in Ontario. And the budget did not go down well in Ontario, except perhaps among Bay Street stockbrokers. Ontario Tory premier Bill Davis, whose "Big Blue Machine" has kept the Tories in office there for over thirty years, had hard words about the budget when it came down. It is quite possible, although it would be denied by all concerned, that the Big Blue Machine may provide less than enthusiastic support for Joe Clark's brand of Toryism.

In May the Tories did well in Ontario. Doing well in Ontario got them a slender minority government. Only a major miracle, of the kind required for canonizations, will give the Tories any substantial representation from Quebec.

Mr. Clark and the Tories will no doubt continue to blame the winter elections on "the socialists" and the Liberals. This is a serious distortion of the facts. When Mr. Clark announced, on May 23, that he would govern as if he had a majority, he said in effect that he was not going to discuss policies and programs with any opposition members. With a self-righteous arrogance that rivals the sometimes arrogant Trudeau at his worst, the Tories proceeded to govern as if they indeed did have a majority. The promises that induced Ontario to give them a minority government are a shambles.

Canadians looking for someone to vote against still have a variety of choices. A vote for either the NDP or the Liberals is a vote against the Tory budget. The anti-Trudeau vote can go to the Tories or the NDP. Ontario voters could accept Clark's challenge and vote for "the socialists" of the NDP. An NDP government is most unlikely, but a strong showing by the third party in Ontario could effectively spoil the chances of either old-guard party for a majority government. Right now, one guess is as good as another, and most observers are not even guessing.

JORDAN BISHOP

(Jordan Bishop, a regular contributor, teaches at the College of Cape Breton in Nova Scotia.)

Of several minds: *Abigail McCarthy*

VOICES OF THEIR CAPTORS

WHEN THE HOSTAGES COME HOME

WHEN THE FAMILIES of the hostages in Iran came to Washington to meet with the president and to be briefed by the State Department, one of those asked to meet with them informally was correspondent Richard Dudman, bureau chief of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. It was thought that he could help them to be prepared for the changes captivity would have wrought in persons held so long, because he himself had been held captive by guerrillas in Cambodia. He and two other reporters had blundered into a zone dominated by Communist-led guerrillas while trying to follow American and South Vietnamese troops during our incursion into Cambodia during the Nixon administration.

It is now well known that a queer bond develops between captor and captive. The psychological effect of this bond has even been given a name—the "Stockholm syndrome," named for the woman held hostage during the robbery of the Kreditbank there. She became emotionally attached to one of the robbers, broke her engagement to another man after the incident, and maintained her attachment to her former captor during his prison term. The most outstanding and acute example of the effect of the Stockholm syndrome in this country is undoubtedly that of Patty Hearst. Dudman freely acknowledges that he was affected by the syndrome:

"Looking back at that time, I can recall my exaggerated gratitude toward the five guerrillas who were put in charge of us. For not killing us. For promising not to mistreat us any more. (They had been beaten on the first day of capture.) For giving us the same food they had, and for saving our lives three times, when U.S. war-planes attacked our area.

"When they released us I felt I was leaving true friends . . . I refused to tell intelligence officers in Saigon the exact place where we had been released . . . In writing about the experience, I recalled with fondness the pleasures of eating roast dog and playing chess with our captors. I tried to avoid calling them guards . . . and preferred the term 'escorts.' My analysis at the time was that we had faced a common danger together and in a sense had become comrades."

He says that he now knows that he was not fully himself for two years after his capture, and that he did not fully escape the syndrome until Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia—nine years later!

These admissions come as something of a revelation. To those of us in Washington, where Dick Dudman is one of the most highly respected of journalists, his attitude on his return seemed consistent with his long-held and outspoken conviction that the war in Indochina was a disastrous adventure, unworthy of the United States. Furthermore, he and the other two correspondents had had the rare opportunity of seeing the war from the other side. If he was soft on his captors that fact was more or less obscured by the excellent reporting in his book, *40 Days with the Enemy*, which, as General Ridgway wrote at the time, threw new light on a little known facet of the situation in Southeast Asia. The mind has its defenses, and the characteristic double view of the writer, who observes, as it were from afar, at the same time that he or she is experiencing the most intense of experiences and emotions, is one good defense.

But Dick Dudman is a kindly man, well-loved in this town of transients for his ability to maintain enduring friendships and the gift of devoting time and interest to his friends, old and new, despite the pressures of his work. There probably never was such a gathering in

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the capital as the block party his friends and neighbors (of whom I count myself one) gave to celebrate his return. Everyone there from cabinet members to school children had done what he could—signed petitions, written letters, used every means of access to plead or negotiate for his release. I remember now that he wandered through that happy crowd looking a little dazed. He could not, of course forget the newsmen still in captivity, I thought—but it now seems possible that he was coping with the psychological disorientation of which he and the specialists on captivity now warn. His warm nature made him vulnerable.

What Richard Dudman warns us to expect of the hostages on return or in interviews must certainly be heeded. We must remember that they have become, at least partially, and for a time, the voices of their captors—and we must understand why. But when I went back to check his book in view of this new knowledge, I found something else we should heed as well. "Why were we released?" asks Richard Dudman rhetorically, and notes that the Viet Cong usually released prisoners only for a clear political purpose. They also released them on a token basis, never in wholesale numbers. Furthermore, since their object was influencing public opinion, they responded best to foreign intermediaries, private American citizens and groups, and possibly members of Congress, but not to the executive. Dudman writes of a time of war, but who doubted that the radicals in the embassy conceive of themselves as in a state of war? The parallels are obvious, and the similarity of technique in the selective release of women and blacks, the media-oriented demonstrations, and the Christmas invitation to sympathetic clergymen, all too visible. How well will we endure the battle of attrition all this implies? A lot depends on our being prepared to meet the realities.

ABIGAIL McCARTHY

Of several minds: *Thomas Powers*

THIS TIME IT IS MUNICH

THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING

THE MOST DIFFICULT choice which ever faces men in power is the choice between war now and war later. Ordinary citizens distinguish between peacetime and wartime but for men in power war is never far away. When they are not waging it they are preparing for it or recovering from it so they can begin to prepare again. They do not love it; they are possessed by it. A prudent man can recognize a threat of war when it is there before him, and once he has recognized it he cannot prudently ignore it. The climate of war-mindedness is one of the great facts about national capitals. But even so men in power are like the rest of us, they shrink before the imminence of war and tremble inside when the choice before them is war now or war later.

One can sense the shrinking now, and it is not confined to Washington. The military borders of the Soviet Union have remained unchanged since the Second World War, until December 28. Now the Russians have invaded and are in the process of occupying Afghanistan, an independent country. The whole world is of course watching to see if the United States does something about it, or does nothing about it. The awful temptation—for President Carter, for other governments, for all of us whose only role is to read the newspapers in the morning—is to say oh hell, let them have it. Smoother words, naturally, would be found to say it, but the very ease, and the seeming prudence, of explaining it away is only part of the temptation. There's nothing we can do, the small voice says. Afghanistan is a joke, not a country. It doesn't matter. *Not now*.

This trepidation is well founded. The most dangerous aspect of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan is the fact they have committed their own soldiers. They have already resorted to arms. War is not a possibility; it is here. But other questions still remain to be answered: how long will the war last? Who will fight in it? What sort of weapons will be used? Who will win? What will the world be like when the war is over?

It is of course possible—but I do not think it likely—that the war will quickly escalate into a major conflagration. It has been a kind of rule since 1945 that the United States and the Soviet Union will not oppose each other's troops with their own. Whoever moves first is given, in effect, a clear field. American forces did not oppose the Russians in East Berlin, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, just as the Russians did not oppose the United States in Korea or Vietnam. There is no evidence anyone in Washington has proposed to send U.S. soldiers to Afghanistan. That would embrace the large war which small wars, by the crazy logic of the world, are intended to preclude. But this only widens the door to temptation: since we are agreed on the primacy of restraint, the small voice says, it's all right to do nothing. We've been outmaneuvered this time, but the invasion speaks for itself, world opinion will swing to our side, next time we'll be quicker off the mark. *Not now*.

The strength of the temptation can be glimpsed in the complete absence of anger about what the Russians have done. People are distressed, alarmed, frightened, in some cases even embarrassed by the invasion, but they do not seem to be angry about it. This demands some sort of explanation. The opposition to the war in Vietnam was fundamentally fueled by anger. It was not critical analysis of official policy which turned the country against the war, but a sense that no country had a right to inflict such devastation and suffering on another country for what amounted to reasons of its own. If it was wrong for us to do so, there can be no excuse for the Russians either. Invasion is the ultimate international crime, the armed theft of a nation's property, freedom, and destiny. The

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Russians began their theft on the sly; when the Afghans resisted, the Russians sent in an army to seize by main force what had eluded covert political manipulation.

The rest of the world—including us—can have few illusions about what must be happening. For one thing there is no cruder or more brutal weapon for settling a political struggle than an army. As we learned in Vietnam, an army is inherently incapable of distinguishing friend from foe unless both are in uniform, with the result that violence is general and indiscriminate. But that is only part of the horror. Russian control of Eastern Europe was imposed by terror as well as tanks, and the Afghans can expect the same thing—wholesale executions and imprisonment, dissolution of all opposition groups, suppression of all civil rights. No outsiders will watch what is happening. The truth will seep out in ten or twenty years' time, but by then Afghan society will have been altered beyond recognition. If the Afghan rebels continue to resist their villages will be destroyed, their families driven out as refugees. At this very moment in the prison cellars of Kabul Russian interrogators must be extracting the names addresses, and personal histories of the old Afghanistan which is now marked for burial. We might draw as lurid a picture as we like without doing violence to the facts. The postwar histories of Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia leave absolutely no room for ambiguity.

Then why has there been no protest? No simple anger at the crime? The silence of the peace movement can be explained by confusion, doubts about what to do, a fear of seeming to repudiate their own history, pure bewilderment after fifteen years of principled opposition to the foreign policies of their own country. Clear and vocal condemnation of the Soviet Union must seem, to many people, like a surrender to all their old enemies in this country, the hardliners waiting to say I told you so. But the peace people have not been alone in their silence. It is hard to think of anyone, in any country, who has thrown political calculation to the winds and spoken out in a voice of cold, pure anger at what the Russians are doing.

The explanation, I think, must be fear—not personal fear of the immediate consequences, but fear that nothing can be done, fear the Russians are inexorable, fear of self-recrimination—even self-contempt—if we once admit the Afghans are being abandoned, and what they are being abandoned *to*. If it must happen, let it happen in quiet. Even the hawks in Washington are talking only about the future, beefing up the defense budget, putting détente to rest and building a new tougher policy, stripped of illusion. If we allow ourselves to become angry about Afghanistan, simple self-respect may force us to attempt to do something about it. But it's too late, the Russians were too quick, we can't help, *not now*.

Does it matter? Well *of course* it matters. Quite apart from the fact the outcome of the invasion matters very much to the Afghans, it matters to us and to the Russians. Nothing will be very different the morning after the last shot is fired, but what we do will have an effect on how we think about ourselves a year later, or ten years later. If the Russians succeed they will not be able to resist a swagger. If they fail they will be chastened and cautious, just as we were after Vietnam. If we let the Russians succeed—if we surrender to the small voice and say oh hell, let them have it—the echo of that act will come back to haunt us with self-doubt, and with the most dangerous result of all, the doubter's determination to prove himself the next time around. This is the very heart of what we have meant for forty years by the word "Munich"—that nothing makes nations more unpredictable, impulsive, and erratic than a challenge which meets no response, or a grossly inadequate response. The winner of a face-down is likely to press his luck, and the loser to grow obstinate. If Munich offers a lesson it is that responding too weakly is as dangerous, ultimately, as responding too strongly.

Then what of President Carter's response? Too weak or too strong? In the weeks since the Russian divisions moved into Afghanistan Carter has canceled sales of grain and high-technology hardware, offered military aid to Pakistan, closed the Russian consulate in New York, pressed for condemnation of the Soviet Union in he United Nations, postponed a vote on the SALT treaty (which at that point was practically doomed in the Senate anyway), strengthened the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, proposed a boycott of the summer Olympic Games in Moscow, and called on U.S. allies to take similar measures. Critics of these moves in the United States have pointed out that they won't "work"—i.e., force the Russians to withdraw, that they hurt us more than the Russians, that other nations seem ready to sell the goods we withhold, that SALT is too important to abandon. The thrust of these criticisms is very far from being that Carter has been too weak. If anything, he is being faintly counseled to call it a day, let the Games proceed, attempt to salvage the remnants of détente. There have even been attempts to explain away the invasion as characteristic of Russian anxiety about their borders. The Russians, it is said, will be bogged down in mountain warfare, Afghanistan had been within their sphere anyway, the real threat is to the Persian Gulf, and we can stand fast there.

The one factor most ignored in this situation is that of the rebels themselves. In a sense, they *are* Afghanistan. It is clear they have both an appetite and a motive for warfare. At the moment they have ready access to sanctuary in Pakistan and southern Iran. The decision facing Carter now, one far tougher than the matter of the Olympic Games, is whether or not to join with China and Pakistan in supplying the rebels with the armaments they need if they are to do anything more than plink at Russian patrols from behind rocks. Without such outside help—help of the very sort given in liberal measure by Russia to North Vietnam—the rebels haven't any chance at all. It may very well be that the political and economic reprisals ordered by Carter so far are the best that he can do. I don't know. But I do know what the small voice says: it's too late, the rebels are divided, the Russians are too tough, it's kinder to get it over with, the dangers are too great, this isn't the place, *not now*. THOMAS POWERS

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Hostages in their homeland

RICHARD J. KRICKUS

NOT LONG after he was released in the exchange of five dissidents for two Soviet spies, Aleksandr Ginzburg was invited to speak before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe—a joint legislative/executive body formed to oversee the Helsinki Accords.

"I must start with a sad announcement," he began his testimony. "Father Karolis Garuckas, Catholic priest, member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, died of cancer on April 5. His signatures are on all the" group's documents. "In 1977, during the trial of Viktoras Petkus, also a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, Father Karolis, already gravely ill, said: 'We worked together with him, so you should put me in the dock as well. I would consider it an honor to die in the camp, as many other servants of the Lithuanian Church have died.' Hundreds of Lithuanians came to bury Father Karolis. . . . We also mourn his death. May I ask you to join me in honoring his memory by observing a minute of silence."

The entire audience, reporters, and commissioners all rose in response. Ginzburg then alluded to other prisoners of conscience, among them Balys Gajauskas, a Lithuanian who like Petkus was in a Soviet prison for his human rights activities.

Decades before the term "human rights" became fashionable, events which would involve them in such activities had been set in motion with the annexation of Lithuania by the Soviet Union. The "legal basis" for the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR was part of a secret protocol to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. In the summer of 1940, as Russian troops marched into Lithuania, rigged elections were held establishing a pro-Soviet government. Several weeks later the new People's Diet unanimously declared Lithuania a Soviet Socialist Republic.

In June 1941, just prior to the Wehrmacht's invasion of the USSR, 35,000 Lithuanian political leaders, intellectuals, and some clergy were rounded up and shipped to concentration camps in the Soviet Union. When the Russians returned in 1945, they began a six-year deportation of an estimated 350,000 Lithuanians; many Lithuanian leaders were executed. Included in this number were Catholic clergy. Stalin clearly intended to destroy the Catholic church, which served about 85.5 percent of the country's population of three million. He outlawed all religious orders, closed and demolished churches, and those priests who escaped execution or arrest were exiled or denied the opportunity to perform their pastoral duties. His draconian methods forced priests and nuns to conduct religious activities underground in private homes and wherever they could be performed undetected by the KGB.

In 1947, seventeen-year-old Viktoras Petkus was arrested for his activities in an anti-Soviet Catholic youth organization, Ateitis ("the future"). He received a ten-year sentence at hard labor but was released in 1953 in a post-Stalinist amnesty. Upon returning home he graduated from high school and attended Vilnius University as a major in Lithuanian literature. He was convinced that "the preservation of (Lithuania's) national culture (and) spiritual values" represented another way to struggle against the subjection of his country.

He collected and distributed the works of Lithuanian writers, including those who had fled their homeland rather than endure Soviet rule. In 1957 he was arrested and imprisoned for disseminating "anti-Soviet" propaganda. Thomas Venclova, one of the founders of the Lithuanian Helsinki Watch Group, now teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, has commented, "It is interesting to note that at that time, in 1957, a collection of the Russian poems of Jurgis Baltrusaitis, published in 1912, that is five years before the Revolution, was included in this 'anti-Soviet literature'."

After serving his full eight-year term, Petkus returned home but was not allowed to teach literature. He worked at various jobs, among them hospital attendant and sexton in several Roman Catholic churches. His commitment to the preservation of Lithuanian culture had not cooled in prison; on the contrary, he devoted much of his time to composing a massive

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bibliography of Lithuanian poets and frequently gathered with young Lithuanians who wanted to learn more about aspects of their country's history and culture which were neglected or distorted at school. The KGB kept him under close surveillance and was especially displeased by the assistance he lent to the mother of Simas Kudirka, who was seeking the release of her son from prison. Kudirka had jumped ship off the Massachusetts coast in November 1970, but was returned to his superiors under orders from the Coast Guard. His return became a cause célèbre and after several years he was released and allowed to emigrate to the United States when it was learned that his mother was an American citizen. It is revealing that when the Coast Guard was considering whether to keep him on board the American vessel or return him to the Soviet ship, the officer in charge characterized Kudirka as a "traitor." Like many Americans, he simply did not understand that most people who reside in the USSR are not Russians and many of them do not think of the Soviet Union as "their country." As Kudirka informed his prosecutors during his trial: "My decision to go abroad does not even contradict your constitution to emigrate (sic), as you seem to have conveniently forgotten. I say your constitution. It is not mine. If my country, Lithuania, were sovereign and free, I would not be standing here before you."

DESPITE KGB harassment, Petkus remained free. In 1975, however, Sergei Kovalev, the Russian biologist who was a charter member of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and one of the editors of the dissident Russian samizdat (underground) journal, *The Chronicle of Current Events*, was arrested. In December he was tried in Vilnius, allegedly because of his association with Lithuanian civil rights activists. Although Kovalev had assisted the Lithuanians on occasion, Andrei Sakharov claims that he was tried in Lithuania to discourage friends and supporters from attending his trial and to limit publicity about it. This ploy did not deter Sakharov and several other Russians from making the trip. They were joined by Lithuanian protesters outside the courthouse, but all were denied entrance to witness the four-day trial. Petkus was among the Lithuanians who sought access and it was here that he met Sakharov. The KGB informed Petkus that his association with Kovalev's supporters and his attempt to witness the trial would get him in trouble.

Unintimidated, Petkus helped form the Lithuanian Helsinki Monitoring Group in November 1976, emulating several sister organizations which had been established in other parts of the Soviet Union to monitor "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Accords guaranteeing freedom of speech, conscience, and travel. In December, Petkus announced the formation of the Lithuanian group in Sakharov's Moscow apartment. The significance of Lithuanians and Russians—traditional enemies—working together in a dangerous undertaking did not escape the authorities' attention. Under the Czars and the Soviet rulers alike, inter-ethnic divisions have deterred the formation of opposition to government abuses of power. Ethnic cleavages, as well as the power of the Soviet state, represent a strong barrier to the success of the reform movement in the USSR today.

The Moscow dissidents' help has had a marked impact upon the Lithuanians' perception of "Russians." In October 1975, when Sakharov received the Nobel Peace Prize, the editors of the samizdat *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* wrote: "All the people of good will in Lithuania are truly happy that your courageous struggle for justice, freedom and the dignity of man was highly esteemed, that your big heart, in which even the tribulations of the persecuted Lithuanians found a place, did not go unnoticed . . ." And after Kovalev's arrest, the editors remarked that the work of the Russian liberals had "compelled the Lithuanians to take another look at the Russian nation . . ." and that "(T)he court process and persecution shows that the secret police is capable of bringing closer together the Lithuanian and Russian nations."

The Lithuanian group documented human rights violations and sent material to Soviet authorities and the 1977 Belgrade Commission monitoring the Helsinki Accords. They brought to the Commission's attention numerous examples of how the Soviet government violated human rights:

> —"The freedom of religious worship is guaranteed by the USSR and LSSR (Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic) Constitutions, but the faithful of Lithuania do not enjoy this right."
>
> —"Most Lithuanian Catholics, especially intellectuals, cannot attend religious services, because they are then discharged from their jobs, for instance teachers and the like."
>
> —"(T)he Catholics of Lithuania are not allowed to enjoy the rights and freedoms contained in international agreements, and which the Soviet Union pledged to respect and uphold."

The document concentrated on the plight of the Catholics, but in addition to Catholics such as Petkus and Garuckas, a Lithuanian Jewish intellectual who had been denied a visa to Israel, Eitan Finkelstein, also signed. Such inter-religious cooperation is another source of concern on the part of the authorities. According to the Lithuanian *Chronicle*—which has thanked Jewish organizations and journalists for publicizing the plight of Catholics in Lithuania—Father Garuckas received a letter from "Lithuanians" attacking him for maintaining contact with "Jews like Dr. Finkelstein." The *Chronicle*'s editors suggested that the letter was bogus, the work of the KGB which hoped to divide the Catholics and the human rights activists associated with The Helsinki Watch Group with the wedge of anti-Semitism.

The Helsinki Accords were widely publicized and praised in the Soviet press so the Lithuanian Helsinki Watch Group was a source of embarrassment and the authorities decided to crush it. Given Petkus's record, he became their main target. According to the Lithuanian *Chronicle*: "On August 23, 1977 at about 1:00 PM, at the Vilnius railroad station, security police arrested Viktoras Petkus . . . a search was conducted in the Petkus apartment and two typewriters and many documents were confiscated. At present Viktoras Petkus is being held at

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the State Security Prison Vilnius, Lenino 40." He remained there until the second week of July, 1978—the same time Shcharansky and Ginzburg were tried; Petkus was found guilty of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and was sentenced to three years in prison and seven years at hard labor. Upon finishing his ten-year sentence he would live in enforced exile from Lithuania for five years. Sakharov said Petkus refused to enter the court and had to be dragged in by four soldiers. He is now Scharansky's cellmate at Christopol prison in the Tartar Republic.

MANY LITHUANIANS who had resisted the Germans gathered together with new recruits to fight the Soviets the second time they occupied Lithuania. Balys Gajauskas, than a teenager, joined the partisan movement which waged a guerrilla war against the Red Army until 1952. About 50,000 Lithuanians were killed in the process. Gajauskas was caught in 1948 and sentenced to 25 years in a Soviet labor camp.

"Many times during discussions with prison camp and KGB officials," he said, "the question was raised: 'Why did you lead the fight against the Soviet regime?' They did not

want to face facts, to recognize the injustice which reigned supreme in those days. . . . Who could have quietly accepted the sight of bayonet-wielding foreign troops surrounding mothers and children, whose fathers and husbands were being deported to Siberia. . . . One's conscience would not allow silence."

In prison, Gajauskas, whose formal education did not extend beyond high school, devoted his time to self-education and mastered many languages, including English. After serving his full term, he was released in 1973. He returned to the city of Kaunas where his elderly mother lived on a pension. He was denied legal residence, however, and his mother was fined on several occasions for harboring an "illegal resident." He found work as an electrician but, using the pretext that he was living outside the law, the KGB persistently harassed him; he was often interrogated and ordered to leave Lithuania or face arrest.

Ignoring these threats, Gajauskas gathered documents bearing on the post-World War II Lithuanian resistance movement. He also collected the names of prisoners who were serving time for their political beliefs. Working with Aleksandr Ginzburg, Gajauskas helped distribute money from the Solzhenitsyn fund to them and members of their families.

While in prison he had met political prisoners from various backgrounds who, in spite of ethnic, religious, and political differences, shared the common bound of fighting for human rights. Ironically, the KGB's policy of integrating political prisoners from all parts of the Soviet Union in the Gulag Archipelago enabled them to work together during and after their incarceration. To no small degree this practice provided a network for the spread of the human rights movement which evolved in the USSR after Soviet forces crushed the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

On Christmas Eve 1974, the KGB searched Gajauskas's apartment and found religious literature, fifty pages of a Lithuanian translation of the *Gulag Archipelago*, a list of political prisoners, and money from the Solzhenitsyn fund. He was picked up, interrogated for three days, and released. It is unclear why he was not arrested at that time. But in February 1977 his apartment was searched again. This time his luck ran out; the security agents confiscated a camera, personal letters, a photo-enlarger and his mother's diaries. On April 20, he was interrogated as a witness in a case involving the Catholic *Chronicle*, then arrested and detained at the KGB isolation prison in Vilnius. A year later, he was tried and sentenced to ten years hard labor and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Since then Gajauskas has married his fiancee, Irena Dumbryte, in Moldavia where he is imprisoned. A priest accompanied her from Lithuania to perform a Roman Catholic ceremony but the authorities would not allow it. A civil ceremony was held instead and after two hours Mrs. Gajauskas was told to leave. She was informed that she would not be permitted to see her husband again for four years.

ALTHOUGH ANDREI SAKHAROV has called upon the Western press to help win the release of Petkus and Gajauskas and Amnesty International has declared them prisoners of conscience, the American Catholic community has been relatively silent about their plight. This can be attributed to several inter-related factors. First, because of widespread ignorance about East Europe, it is not surprising that many Americans do not know that Lithuania was an independent country prior to 1940. Second, Americans of Lithuanian descent number about two million but most of them do not have strong ties to Lithuania. The union of both factors explains in part why the Catholic clergy has not demonstrated much interest in the persecution of Lithuania's Catholics.

The Vatican's attempt to reconcile differences with Communist governments (the policy of *Ostpolitik*) may also play a part in the silence of the American Catholic hierarchy. Pope John Paul II's forthright defense of religious liberty, however, constituting a revision of his predecessors' cautious approach to *Ostpolitik*, may encourage American Catholics to employ their considerable influence in the defense of co-religionists in the USSR who are victims of human rights violations.

The Vatican's *Ostpolitik* policy was first formulated in the early 1960s by Pope John XXIII. He contended that the Soviet Union was a powerful reality that had to be dealt with and in his famous Encyclical *Pacem in Terris* he urged greater toleration

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of Communism and the Communist governments. He observed that many people worldwide were attracted to Marxism because they were victims of poverty, ignorance, and neglect. The encyclical was favorably received in the Soviet Union and widely publicized there. During Vatican II, observers from the Moscow Patriarchate were invited to Rome and in 1963 the leader of the Uniate, or Eastern Rite Catholic Church, Metropolitan Josef Slipyi (in jail since 1945) was released and allowed to go there. The Vatican, in turn, supported Christian-Marxist dialogues to reduce the chasm separating the competing philosophies.

In 1967 after Khrushchev's downfall, the Kremlin's efforts to improve relations with the Vatican were stepped up as President Podgorny had an audience with the pontiff and representatives of the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church met to discuss areas of cooperation. The Soviets recognized that the Vatican, which represented half a billion Catholics, wielded considerable influence. By establishing détente with the Vatican, the Kremlin hoped that Catholics in Western Europe—France and Italy in particular—might find it less difficult to vote for Communist candidates and that the prospects for promoting Soviet objectives in Latin America would also be enhanced. The Soviets were especially anxious to secure the Holy See's support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and got it.

Although some conservatives criticized the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* policy, Pope Paul VI—who on other matters was closer to them than to the church's liberals—defended it by proclaiming that it would allow the church "sufficient breathing space" in the Communist lands. On another occasion he said that the Vatican's goal was "to save what can be saved" in those countries dominated by Communists.

ALTHOUGH this attempt at reconciliation was favorably received in the West, there was strong resistance to it among Catholics living in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was clearly the case in Lithuania. Here the church was divided between "moderates" who adhered to the Vatican's advice to keep a low profile and the "militants" who believed that to suffer persecution in silence was leading to the demise of Catholicism in their country. But the church militants clearly had the support of most Lithuanian Catholics. The burgeoning Catholic civil rights movement attracted people from all parts of the country and every walk of life. During a two-year period in the early 1970s, for example, 50,000 Lithuanians courageously signed petitions protesting the government's anti-church activities which were in violation of Soviet law.

In March 1972, opponents of *Ostpolitik* began documenting the persecution of Catholics through the *Chronicle*. It took many forms, involving restrictions on hearing confessions, conducting funerals and Mass, administering last rites, celebrating holy days, providing religious instruction, printing church literature, selling religious objects, and caring for church property and securing funds. Priests who persisted in performing such pastoral duties openly were fined or imprisoned. Lay Catholics were fired from their jobs for attending church and youngsters were expelled from school or denied entrance to college for doing the same. Catholics who refused to accept restrictions on their religious beliefs were put in prison or incarcerated in mental hospitals.



The *Chronicle*'s editors opposed the Vatican's giving its blessings to church appointees who were "approved of" by the Soviet government and who meekly accepted anti-church policies. They reminded the Vatican that the KGB placed agents in the Kaunas seminary and encouraged seminarians to spy on their fellow students. Moreover, there was not a sufficient number of young people allowed into the seminary to replace priests who had died or retired and those who got in were being denied books and curricula necessary to provide them with a contemporary Catholic theological education.

The editors used moderate language and restrained rhetoric, carefully checked out complaints, and made demands that were consistent with the Lithuanian and Soviet constitutions. They warned, however, that by persecuting Catholics the authorities were turning the Lithuanian masses against the government. "We still want to believe that the government of the Soviets will understand that it is committing a major error in supporting the atheist minority (in Lithuania) and thus inciting the Catholic masses against it."

The security police conducted a nationwide campaign to arrest the *Chronicle*'s editors, and sought to discredit it by forcing people who had contributed to it to retract their statements and by inducing clergy friendly to the government to disavow the *Chronicle*. In 1973 the KGB arrested numerous people allegedly associated with it. It is noteworthy that those who were imprisoned were from peasant and working-class backgrounds; none had more than high school educations and none were clergy. In marked contrast to the Russian dissidents, they were bona fide members of the proletariat, militants of what the authorities feared was a burgeoning mass movement—although few Lithuanians who felt as they did had the courage to openly challenge the system.

The Soviet constitution guarantees freedom of religion, but the men and women arrested were accused of political crimes under Article 70 of the penal code, which refers to "organized activities that seek to prepare or commit especially dangerous crimes against the state." Their imprisonment did not, how-

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ever, stop the *Chronicle*'s publication and in 1976 new supporters were caught, imprisoned, or confined to psychiatric hospitals for examination. Several people who have protested human rights violations have died under mysterious circumstances. Mindaugas Tamonois, who worked at the Institute for the Conservation of Monuments, for example, refused to repair a monument honoring the Red Army unless a monument to those who resisted Stalin was also built and the Social and Christian Democrat parties were legalized. He was put in a mental hospital for examination, where he received drugs which subsequently led to a serious nervous disorder. In November 1975 he was found dead, killed by a train in what was an alleged suicide.

In spite of a nationwide campaign to destroy it, the KGB has not interrupted the *Chronicle*'s publication. It now carries pictures, letters from prisoners of conscience, reports of human rights activities in other parts of the Soviet Union, and its editors have spoken out in behalf of persecuted Catholics in Belorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, and Siberia. New people have filled the ranks of the Helsinki Watch group left vacant by Garuckas's death, Petkus's imprisonment, and Venclova's departure for the United States. (The son of a prominent Communist, he was given a visa to teach at the University of California but later stripped of his citizenship.) Catholic civil rights activists and persons associated with the Helsinki Watch group—like Petkus and Gajauskas oftentimes one and the same—have begun to work together and several other samizdat publications treating Lithuanian history, culture, and political affairs are in circulation.

NONETHELESS, the Catholics in Lithuania are waging a desperate struggle which they may not win. V. Stanley Vardys, one of the leading scholars of Lithuania in the United States, has characterized the church's prospects as follows:

"(T)he disastrous decline of the numbers and the intellectual preparation of the clergy and a jealous control of admission to the priesthood is likely to allow doctrinal and religious devastation of the Catholic people whose numbers, too, are not growing with the population, but shrinking, though the sympathies of many a-religious people very likely remain with the church. The statistical profile of the institution, in other words, shows a church that is still strong by any comparison except with its own past, but whose condition can very quickly go from worse to desperate."

These words were written before the Polish Cardinal Wojtyla, who staunchly resisted efforts to compromise the Catholic church in his country, became pope. Although he is committed to a policy of reconciliation with the Communist governments, Pope John Paul II has revised the *Ostpolitik* policy of his predecessors insofar as he has boldly spoken out against religious persecution in Eastern Europe and the USSR. He did just that on numerous occasions during his triumphant tour of Poland in June. In Gniezno, Poland's oldest diocese, he indicated that his ascendancy to the papacy had been preordained. "Is it not Christ's will, that this Slav Pope should at this precise moment manifest the spiritual unity of Christian Europe." He angered the Communist authorities when he spoke of the "silent church" in those parts of Europe where a religious freedom does not exist and verbalized the incompatibility between Christianity and Communism.

In Czestochowa, however, he reaffirmed the Vatican's policy of *Ostpolitik*, asserting that the church would "cooperate with all countries and with all peoples of good will." It is essential to have a dialogue with the Communist governments, he said; but "they must respect the convictions of believers, ensure all the rights of citizens, and also normal conditions for the activity of the church as a religious community."

Pope John Paul II has bolstered the hopes of Lithuania's Catholics. He has stated publicly that "half my heart is in Lithuania"; he named a Lithuanian, Audrys Backis—son of the émigré Lithuanian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington—Undersecretary of the Council of Public Affairs; and it is rumored that he has appointed a Lithuanian, Bishop Julijonas Steponavicius—who has been prevented by the Soviet government from carrying out his role as Archbishop of Vilnius since 1961—as a Cardinal "in pectore" . . . secretly, or "in the breast." Recently, in a letter to the pope read before Western correspondents, a group of Lithuanians belonging to the "Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers" proclaimed: "We were overjoyed when we heard from the lips of your holiness that the silent church no longer exists and that from now on it will speak with the voice of the pope."

THE POPE'S pronouncements on religious liberty have certainly had an impact upon Lithuania's Catholics, but perhaps an even more far-reaching consideration is the impact they will have upon Catholics in the United States. During his visit to Poland in June and his tour of the United States in October, the pope, via television, profoundly moved Americans of all backgrounds; they were impressed by his intellect, wit, and humanity. But perhaps most important of all, they were moved by his staunch and eloquent defense of human rights and of the preservation of spiritual and humanistic values cherished in the West. The words he used were not novel but the fact that a man of his stature and character articulated them gave the issue of human rights new legitimacy.

The Lithuanians state categorically that they are counting on Western pressure to encourage the Soviets to change their policies toward the Catholic church. What they are demanding is simply the freedom to adhere openly to their religious beliefs and practices as Soviet law permits. Indeed, they would welcome the opportunity to conduct their affairs even in the limited fashion granted Catholics in Poland. For all intents and purposes, their fate depends upon the help they receive from the West and from their co-religionists in particular.

Presently there is only one organized effort in the United States to collect and disseminate information bearing on the plight of Soviet Catholics—the Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid located in Brooklyn, New York. What is even more startling is that the organization has a single full-time person

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devoted to this work, Father Cazimir Pugevicius; although he receives assistance from a variety of Lithuanian-American organizations, he gets no funds from the church. The vast majority of articles finding their way into the press are the work of this American-born priest who provides documentation and materials to journalists, scholars, and government officials. It is a source of grave frustration to him that the Catholic media, which have outreach throughout the country, have not seen fit to devote much time to the Catholic human rights movement in Lithuania; nor has the United States Catholic Conference, which has a large staff in Washington serving the Catholic Bishops of America in a variety of capacities—conducting research, developing policy options, and disseminating materials.

There is some indication, however, that at long last the American Catholic clergy have begun to move on this front. Under the leadership of several Lithuanian-American organizations, The Coalition to Free Petkus and Gajauskas was formed last April. Support from people of all faiths and backgrounds has been sought—Aleksandr Ginzburg is a member, as is Glen Watts, the President of the Communications Workers of America—but special attention is being devoted to attracting prominent Catholics. This effort has met with success: Notre Dame's President, Father Theodore Hesburgh; Sister Ann Gillen, Executive Director of the National Inter-Religious Task Force on Soviet Jewry; and the labor activist Monsignor George Higgins, among many other influential clergy, have joined the Coalition.

Just how much impact Pope John Paul II's outspoken support for religious freedom has had upon the Coalition's success is uncertain, but it is fair to assume that his blessings have induced many Catholics to join the effort. If the Coalition can successfully demonstrate that it has the support of many prominent Catholics, pressure exerted at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue will take on a new, important aspect. Many members of the House and Senate, along with President Carter and his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, have pledged their support for the release of Petkus and Gajauskas; but if they are convinced that influential Catholic leaders are prepared to employ their clout in this endeavor, it is a safe bet that the Soviets, in turn, will be subject to greater pressure from the American government than has been the case to date.

The Coalition's organizers point out that, while there are many Lithuanian prisoners of conscience, the release of Petkus and Gajauskas may be a matter of life or death. Simas Kudirka, who now lives in Brooklyn, stated after Gajauskas's trial: "This is a certain death sentence for him. He is in very poor health as a result of the twenty-five years he has already spent in Russian concentration camps." Petkus, a man in his fifties who has suffered the rigors of Soviet prisons for fifteen years, is not faring well either.

To no small degree, the fate of both depends upon the reaction of America's Catholics. The editors of the Catholic *Chronicle*, in a plea to Western Catholics, have observed, "If the Catholics of Lithuania can be defended by non-Catholics and even persons of atheistic persuasion, like Academician Andrei Sakharov or Sergei Kovalev, at the risk of their freedom, then all the more we expect a word of intercession from our brothers the Catholic bishops and believers of other lands."

JOHN PAUL II & CHRISTIAN UNITY

Protestants & the pope

STANLEY HAUERWAS & ROBERT WILKEN

IT IS SURELY too early to assess the role John Paul II will play in future relations between the Reformation churches and the Roman Catholic church, but his visit to the United States, as well as statements he has made in recent months, has prompted us to look closely at his papacy. Any effort on the part of Protestants to assess the pope must be put in the context of the remarkable change in attitude on the part of Protestant theologians towards the Roman papacy in recent years. In the last ten or fifteen years, many Protestants have learned to appreciate the papacy, not simply as an office within the Roman Catholic church, but as an ecumenical office with a ministry to the whole church. On occasion some Protestant leaders have referred to the pope as "our pope." In a world desperately in need of moral and spiritual leadership, and among churches frequently lacking a firm sense of direction and purpose, the bishop of Rome, it seems, is the one Christian leader who has the wisdom, sense of tradition, and courage to speak clearly and cogently to international problems, and who, through his ancient office, could speak to all the churches and for the churches to the world. Especially since the publication of Paul VI's encyclical *On the Development of Peoples*

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(Populorum Progressio), many Christians have realized that when the pope spoke on major social and political problems he spoke not simply for Roman Catholics but for all Christians.

The reasons most frequently given for this shift in attitudes toward the papacy are the Second Vatican Council, the warm and generous personality of John XXIII, or the sympathy of recent popes for the downtrodden peoples of the developing nations. But there are other reasons. The popes of recent years have all been deeply spiritual men, who appeared before the public eye not only as religious leaders and teachers, but as men of prayer, kneeling before an altar, a tomb, a statue, presiding at the Eucharist and administering Communion to the faithful, reading and preaching from the Scriptures. The highly politicized image of the pope, the Renaissance prince or head of the Vatican state, the proud, authoritarian figure who demanded absolute obedience to his infallible teaching, the man who tyrannized fearful consciences with dogmas—images which were dear to Protestant polemics in the past—had given way to the image of a pastoral figure who had shed the ancient princely trappings of his office (by refusing the tiara) and who cared for the poor.

In the wake of these changes, some non-Roman Catholic Christians began to think that the papacy was not the obstacle to Christian unity they had previously thought. After all, the pope was the bishop of Rome, that ancient see to which other bishops appealed; he was the patriarch of the West. The reformers never claimed that they were founding a new church. In any united church the bishop of Rome would certainly have a central role. Perhaps the various Protestant churches could maintain their unique identities which have been formed over four centuries and are still nurtured by traditions of worship, of teaching, of discipleship, of piety, yet look to the bishop of Rome as the symbol of Christian unity.

When the pope arrived in the United States there were many Protestant Christians ready, indeed eager, to embrace John Paul II, to receive his ministry and to hear his words of instruction. There is no doubt that this happened to some, but in speaking to many Protestants during the days the pope was in the United States, and in the weeks afterward, we discovered that something else happened. At first it was simply that they felt uneasy at his style and puzzlement about some of his statements, but as the week wore on these feelings turned to disappointment, disillusionment, and even anger. It was as though the pope had set out to reconfirm our past stereotypes of the papacy and to reawaken feelings that we thought were long forgotten. By the time John Paul II returned to Rome at the end of the week some felt that he had not acted as if he were "our" pope at all, nor as the symbol of Christian unity, nor as teacher of the whole church; he appeared instead as the head of the denomination we know as Roman Catholic and he had come to the United States to rally the troops.

WE THINK it important to register these feelings of unease because our reactions, and the reactions of other Protestants, touch on issues that have not been raised by Roman Catholic commentators who have been preoccupied with the specific moral and ecclesiastical problems he addressed. Moreover, the response of Roman Catholics to the pope has too often reflected a limited understanding of the role of the papal office, i.e., appealing to papal authority when it supports one's pet cause or criticizing the pope when he does not side with the latest social movement. Frequently criticism of the pope's statements has been based on appeals to secular presuppositions about "individual freedom" or "rights" that fail to address the genuinely theological issues at stake. As much as we admired the courage of Sister Theresa Kane to address the pope directly, we think her followers misstated the issue by arguing her case in terms of "rights." If women should be ordained, as we think they should be, it is not because they have a "right" to ordination, but because they have been called to this ministry and because there is no sure Scriptural understanding of the office ministry that prevents it. If contraception is morally permissible, as we think it is, it is not because our sexual behavior is our "own private business," but because there are no theological or moral arguments that entail that every act of sexual intercourse should be open to procreation. In this article, however, we are not concerned with the particular claims the pope made about ordination of women, contraception, or the celibacy of clergy; what troubles us is that in addressing these and other matters, the pope spoke as if no other significant body of Christian experience and thinking existed.

Now it might be asked: what did you expect? This was the first pastoral visit of a pope to the American Catholic church. He came to a church caught in the throes of change. into an atmosphere of conflicting parties and interests, to bishops fearful of the future and laity uncertain about the meaning of the past. The Roman Catholic church in which millions of Christians had grown up seemed to be disappearing and with the demise of this church many faithful Christians were losing a clear sense of Christian identity. The pope came to encourage the faithful, to give heart to the clergy, to buttress religious communities, to say to one and all that it was good to be Roman Catholic. Why shouldn't the pope accent those things that have traditionally defined Roman Catholic identity? Why should this bother Protestants?

The answer to these questions is that Catholicism is not a private world in which only Roman Catholics have a say. Protestants have a large stake in what it means to be Catholic and the way that the pope, as the bishop of Rome, presents Christ to the world and to the churches. This is not to say that Protestants should have the same say that Roman Catholics do in the Roman Catholic church, but that as long as the Roman Catholic church claims to be Catholic and not simply Roman, Roman Catholic leaders will have to be responsive to the other churches in defining what it means to be Catholic and Christian.

For over four hundred years, sparked by the polemics of the Reformation and the years following, Protestants and Roman Catholics have defined themselves over against each other. The Reformation, however, was not a call for a new form of Christianity, but a movement of reform within the Catholic

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church, a call to rectify abuses that obscured the preaching of the Gospel and had thwarted a life of geuine Christian discipleship. In the Augsburg Confession Philip Melancthon said that "there is nothing here that departs from the Scriptures or the Catholic Church or the church of Rome in so far as the ancient church is known to us from its writers." (Article 21) Not all Protestants would agree with this claim, but it must not be forgotten that most Protestants continue to confess the same words in the creed as do Roman Catholics: "We believe in the one holy catholic and apostolic church." As long as the term "Catholic" is not simply the name of a Christian denomination, Protestants have a stake in the office which claims to speak, in the name of the apostle Peter, for the one holy catholic and apostolic church.

Such an approach to the papacy stands in sharp contrast to the traditions in which most Protestants were raised. But the ecumenical dialogue has taught this generation of Protestants that the papacy is not an unfortunate, aberrant development within the Christian tradition, but a gift to the church, one of the ways by which God leads his church and preserves it in the apostolic faith. As one ecumenical document put it recently: there exists "a ministry in the universal church charged with primary responsibility for the unity of the people of God and their mission to the world." If this is so, in a significant sense, the pope is "our pope," and he can no longer define Catholicism simply by reference to the Roman Catholic tradition.

An indication that John Paul II fails to understand this ministry to the whole church can be seen in his practice, during his stay in the United States, as well as in Ireland, and on return to Rome, of using the term "Vicar of Christ" to apply to himself. As far as we are aware this title has dropped out of papal speeches in recent years, and its appearance gave us pause. The phrase cropped up in a number of papal speeches, for example in Des Moines, Iowa, where John Paul referred to himself as the "Vicar of Christ" who "represents him [Christ] in your midst," or in a speech to Spanish-speaking Christians in Philadelphia, where he spoke of your "communion with the Vicar of Christ." On his return to Rome he urged a group of religious women "to be courageous in a holy manner in following the voice of Christ's Vicar." Moreover, the pope not only used the title in speaking to Roman Catholics but in his farewell message to the United Nations he said that his ministry only had meaning "insofar as he is the faithful Vicar of Christ on earth."

Now it might well be said that this is a traditional papal title and there is no reason for the pope to avoid using it. Nevertheless, there is hardly one title which could be more offensive to Protestants, as well as to the Orthodox. It is most unlikely that the pope called himself the Vicar of Christ while visiting the Patriarch of Constantinople in Istanbul at the end of November. The reason the term is so offensive, as Luther observed long ago, is that it suggests that "being a Christian meant being bound to the pope and to Rome," and that the "papacy is the most important, most necessary, and most unique feature in the church."

Modern historical scholarship has confirmed that the term Vicar of Christ did not become a title for the pope until the middle ages, and that it was not until the thirteenth century during the papacy of Innocent III (1189-1219), that it became the exclusive title of the pope, superseding earlier titles such as the Vicar of St. Peter. Innocent III envisioned himself as a priest-king, an intermediary between God and man, the locus of divine authority in the world, the source from which political authority derived its power as the "moon derives her light from the sun." In his reign the medieval papacy reached the zenith of political and spiritual power. Standing within this tradition Pope Boniface VIII proclaimed, in the bull *Unam Sanctam* (1302) that "it is altogether necessary for salvation that every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff."

It has long been a favorite ploy of Protestant polemics to saddle popes of one's own time with all the excesses of the medieval papacy. How often has it been said: Rome never changes! No matter what later popes or councils may say, it is often presumed by Protestants that what was once decreed by a pope remains church teaching for all times. In singling out the title Vicar of Christ and recalling its historical significance we do not wish to imply that John Paul II envisions himself a latterday Innocent III, nor that the title Vicar of Christ bears in his mind the meaning it had for medieval or Renaissance popes. What we do wish to say, however, is that the title does reawaken an imperialist, even divine view, of the papacy, and that it denies the ecclesial reality of the separated churches. When applied to the office of the papacy the title implies that the pope offers a unique access to Christ and that those in

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communion with him are in communion with Christ.

John Paul II, as well as Roman Catholic theologians and faithful must be reminded how offensive such language is to Christians who belong to the Protestant and Orthodox churches. Only by living and moving solely within the world of Roman Catholicism can Roman Catholics fail to grasp this. As advanced as the ecumenical dialogue may be, it is still the case that for most Roman Catholics *the only church* is still the Roman Catholic church. In stressing this point we do not mean to suggest that Roman Catholics self-consciously isolate themselves or ignore other Christians. Rather we are saying that the sheer size of the Roman Catholic church, when compared to the other Christian bodies, creates a universe that embraces one from birth through the stages of life in a way that few who have not lived within Roman Catholicism can appreciate or understand. The vast majority of Roman Catholics have no experience of the "ecclesial reality" of non-Roman communions.

In such an ecclesiastical environment the pope's visit, coupled with his ecclesiastical style, only served to support the spiritual exclusiveness of Roman Catholicism. In the light of Protestant prejudice and discrimination against Catholics such criticism may appear disingenuous. But such a stress on institutional self-identity is not sufficient to sustain Roman Catholics in the world in which they now live. Because Roman Catholics have lived in a world of their own they are ill-prepared to understand or negotiate a generally pluralist society or to envision a church which embraces many differing Christian traditions. Though many people praised the pope for his moral leadership, he offered no new horizons for Christian fellowship or community. Like a secular politician he spoke bravely and prophetically to people and institutions for which he had no direct responsibility, but when speaking to Roman Catholics he brought a message of institutional self-preservation that will only frustrate the search for Christian unity. For the pope kept alive the illusion that by clinging to the certainty provided by the papal office, Roman Catholics, unlike Protestants, will be immune from the subtle temptations of modernity.

IN HIS ADDRESS before the United Nations the pope called attention to the universal character of the Christian community as it embraces "faithful belonging to almost all countries and continents, nations, peoples, races, languages and cultures." That the church has such a character implies that Christians must be wary of nationalism in whatever form it appears, whether in Western democratic nations or in Marxist countries. Nationalism, along with racism, were the twin evils of our time that Pope Paul VI singled out in his encyclical *On the Development of Peoples*. Yet, when John Paul II was in Poland last summer he reinforced the bond between Polish nationalism and Roman Catholicism, leading one to think that when nationalism is in the self-interest of the church Christians readily forget that the church is a people scattered among the nations, not a national or ethnic community.

While in the United States the pope did not present himself as the kind of teacher who commands the respect of Christians because of what he says, but because he stands in an office which has the power and authority to enforce obedience. Some have criticized the pope because he did little listening. This may be true, but given the rigorous demands of his trip, the necessity to address many and different groups on a dozen different topics, with so many people hanging on his every word, the pope had to be ready with prepared texts for speeches and homilies. The fruits of his visit will no doubt come later. Nevertheless, as teacher he presented himself as one whose views needed no justification, only reinforcing the impression that what he taught depended more on his being the pope than on what he said. Instead of seeking to persuade, he demanded obedience; he appealed not to the understanding but to the will.

The very style of his pronouncements confirmed this impression. It appeared, at least to non-Roman Catholics, as though he, and he alone, was the teacher of the church and that once he has spoken there could be no discussion, no argument, no genuine dissent. He was the sole person responsible for interpreting the Scriptures and the tradition to the present generation of Christians. Though such phrases as "the church teaches through me" are traditional papal phrases, in the mouth of John Paul they conveyed a new spirit, an ominous tone, that give a misleading impression of the teaching office

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in the church. In making general theological or moral pronouncements which readily call for assent by all Christians because they are grounded in the Scriptures and the classical Christian tradition, such language is intelligible and inoffensive. But when the topics are hotly controverted, and men and women of faith, of intelligence and learning differ profoundly, and when the Scriptures and tradition do not sound a clear and decisive note, such language is quite another matter. In such matters the pope, as teacher of the church, cannot insist on obedience to his pronouncements. He must persuade. He must convince the Christian people that he speaks for Christ. As John Calvin observed in discussing the teaching office in the church, teachers must show that they speak "from the Lord's mouth," for they have not been endowed "with any authority to teach or to answer, except in the name and Word of the Lord." If one wishes to teach, says Calvin, "let him show himself to be God's messenger."

We are not suggesting that truth is a matter of democratic vote of consensus. If there are genuine theological reasons why women should not be ordained, or if it can be shown that contraception is inherently immoral, then the pope has the responsibility to stand by such views no matter how unpleasant the consequences. But in these matters, as well as others, there is a large body of Christian opinion that differs from that of the pope. By calling for obedience on such matters, the pope undermines the authority of his office, for the office derives from the universal character of the church.

It is particularly ironic that at the very time that legitimate authority needs to be encouraged and supported in the church (and in society) the pope has chosen to link the teaching authority of the papacy to his person and to interpret authority primarily in terms of obedience. This is a peculiarly modern idea of authority, having its roots more in the nineteenth century than in the classical Christian tradition. In this view, one which is widespread within Roman Catholicism (and also in many sections of Protestantism), authority is set over against reason, persuasion, individual judgment. Instead of viewing authority as an aid to reason and understanding, and therefore to action, authority is made to take the place of reason, and of one's own judgment. The result is that if one is not convinced of the truth of the teaching, the only response is submission or disobedience—neither designed to foster the kind of mature Christian discipleship required today.

As the fathers and medieval theologians realized centuries ago, authority does not have to do with obedience, with the will, but with understanding, enlightenment. "No one believes anything," wrote St. Augustine "unless he has first thought it to be believable." And St. Thomas, speaking of theological discussion in the medieval schools, observed that if a master decides a question "by appeal to bare authorities, the listener will have a certainty that the thing is so, but he will have acquired no knowledge or understanding and will go away with an empty mind." The true test of a teacher's authority is whether his teaching enlightens and persuades. We listen to the teacher and respect his authority because he speaks with greater understanding, greater wisdom, deeper experience, and more truly than do others. In Christianity this dimension of teaching has been traditionally linked to the office but it can never be dependent simply on the office. The purpose of teaching authority within the church is not to gain assent to theological or moral truths but to assist Christians to live lives of Christian discipleship. Any teaching which has that end in mind can never be a matter simply of obedience to the office of the teacher.

For the pope to speak with this kind of authority requires that there be a community of people whose lives are shaped by the Gospel. Such shaping comes primarily from the Holy Scriptures, the life of prayer and worship, the witness of faithful Christians, but also from teaching. That is, theology has a role in the formation of a community of Christians who bear witness to Christ. If the pope is to speak with authority his pronouncements must be theologically disciplined by appeals to the truths of the Gospel. Therefore, contrary to John Paul II's suggestions that theologians must be careful not to upset the laity (or themselves and the hierarchy), theologians must be free to do nothing less if they are faithful to their calling. Theology can never be simply the exposition of what is received from the tradition or proclaimed by the present magisterium. Too much theology within Roman Catholicism in the last hundred years has been an elaborate exercise in justifying the pope's words. Does the pope expect the work of theologians to be any less unsettling than he clearly intends his own pontificate to be?

AS PROTESTANT theologians who have long worked within a Roman Catholic context, we are convinced that such theology can only be done ecumenically. There can be no return to the days when the various Christian communions lived in splendid isolation from one another, nurtured by caricatures of each other, smugly content to define what it meant to be Christian by reference simply to one's own past. We must acknowledge and recover those aspects of our common tradition that were lost in the historical separation of East and West, or in the great division which resulted from the sixteenth century. As our colleague Enda McDonagh has ob-

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served, there can be no genuinely Catholic theology without appropriating the inheritances of the various Christian traditions, not to recover the past, nor to create a super theology which will transcend all differences, but to discover a genuine Catholic unity that is not based on the narrowness of any one separate tradition. The goal of Christian unity is that we all be one in Christ, not that we all look alike.

The papacy of John Paul II begins at a particularly auspicious moment in the church's history when the possibilities of Christian unity are greater than they have been at any time since the Reformation. Our fear is that John Paul II, by his words, by his actions, and by his style, may well make the office of the pope a cause for stumbling, an obstacle to Christian unity, rather than a means to Christian unity.

Over the centuries the office of the papacy has continuously evolved, assuming new roles and responsibilities to meet changing conditions within the church and world. There is no reason, as far as we can see, that the man who is bishop of Rome in the last decades of the twentieth century should perpetuate a style of papal leadership that belongs to an earlier period in Christian history. The developments within the Roman Catholic church in the last several decades, the growing receptivity of non-Roman Catholic Christians to the papacy, even the international recognition given the pope, has set before the pope the possibility of a new role in the church, a new papal vocation if you will. John Paul II, if he is to fulfill the vocation his ancient office offers, must realize he has a ministry which is not confined to the Roman Catholic church but to all Christians. If he is faithful to such a calling, the unity that we proclaim as Christians will not appear to the world as a vague ideal but a living reality made possible by the power of a Savior who has taught us that we must first be servants.



IF ENFORCEMENT IS LEFT TO THE STATES . . .

Kentucky coal: who'll guard the henhouse?

CHARLES R. DiSALVO

DARRELL YOTHER, a strapping 28-year-old East Kentuckian, stood on his front porch one rainy October morning in 1977, staring in disbelief. In the early dawn hours a coal operator had built an earthen sediment pond—to catch run-off from the operator's strip-mine—right in the center of Madlock Hollow Road, the county road which served the Yother home. Yother and his hollow were now cut off from State Route 11 and from the world outside. So, in order to prepare for the child his wife was about to deliver—she was 8½ months pregnant—Darrell Yother packed up a few possessions, left his now useless car in front of his house, and led his wife up the side of the hill, around the pond, through nearly a half-mile of ankle deep mud, down to the main road.

After leaving his wife at the home of relatives, Darrell proceeded directly to the county courthouse. But, as he anticipated, county officials refused to take any action against the coal operator, whose family controlled much of the political action in the county.

Next stop: The state's Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (DNREP), whose duty it is, under Kentucky law, to regulate strip mines. It too refused to take any immediate action against the company.

When asked why, some weeks later, the responsible inspector said, "I forgot." Would some action eventually be taken to discipline the company? "No," he replied, "it's too late."

Finally, Darrell had to institute a private lawsuit and to file charges against the company with DNREP's legal office in Frankfort, the state capital. Rather than delay a pending application for a strip-mine permit, the coal company came to a quick settlement with the homeless Yother.

WHEN PRESIDENT Carter signed the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act into law in August of 1977, environmentalists hoped that there would be fewer Darrell Yothers in strip-mining's future. Section 515 of the Act is the heart of the new law; it requires, among other things, that operators restore the mined land to its approximate original contours and to a condition that would support prior or higher uses, stabilize and control spoil piles, segregate topsoil in the mining process and carefully restore it after mining, minimize disturbances to the water system, and establish permanent revegetation on mined areas.

Now, two years later environmentalists are having second thoughts. For the Act assigns to each coal-producing state primary responsibility for enforcing the federal act within its borders. Only if the state's enforcement program does not meet federal requirements—on paper—will the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) take over the task. So the same type of people who turned deaf ears to Darrell Yother could soon be administering the tougher federal standards—and with about

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as much enthusiasm as they've shown in the past.

The fears of state control are greatest in Kentucky where state officials have a history of coziness with the strip-mine industry. Sit down almost any East Kentuckian not connected with the coal industry or read the pages of the Louisville *Courier Journal* and you will learn of

- The *Courier*-induced admission by the Department's legal staff that it had "lost" the files of scores of cases of violators referred to it for prosecution;
- The admitted reluctance of the present DNREP chief to enforce reclamation laws against underground operations because of "political pressure."
- The case of a district supervisor for DNREP who took reports of violations from his area inspectors and, instead of referring them to Frankfort for action, stuffed them into a secret briefcase for over a year.

There is an almost never-ending litany of similar incidents. Consequently, faith in Kentucky's effort to enforce its own strip-mine law has been, for years, virtually non-existent.

THE COMMONWEALTH'S lackadaisical enforcement policy came under renewed scrutiny in 1977. In April and October of that year two devastating floods ripped through the heart of central Appalachia. The first was more widespread. It did millions of dollars of damage to East Kentucky and Tennessee and Southwest Virginia and West Virginia. In one of the worst episodes of the flood, the Cumberland River surged over the floodwall protecting Pineville, Kentucky, and destroyed much of that small town.

The community of Cranks Creek in southern Harlan County, Kentucky, suffered a fate similar to Pineville's in the October flood. The rains fell; the state-approved sediment ponds of the mines above the community gave way; the hollows disgorged a rampaging avalanche of rock, dirt, and debris; and though no lives were lost, the community was washed away.

A chorus of citizen voices alleged that both floods had been exacerbated, if not caused, by the extensive and illegal surface mining of the steep slopes along the two rivers. Eleven days after the October flood the state shut down five Cranks Creek and Clove Fork mines.

The state's orders to "abate and alleviate" were a first: never before had DNREP's emergency powers been used to shut down a mine. Was this a signal that even the state had finally seen too much? It was not. In the months following the October floods and the mine closures, Kentucky so coddled the offending operators and so mishandled the reclamation effort that it showed itself unworthy of responsibility for enforcing the federal Act.

The shut-down orders were issued on October 13, 1977 against five companies operating on Cranks Creek or on nearby Clover Fork (both branches of the Cumberland River within Harlan County): T & T Darby, J & D Coal Company, Dean Trucking Company, J & F Coal Company and Kentucky Bell Coal Company. The orders catalogued the various abuses committed by the companies which led to conditions hazard-



ous to "the health or welfare of this state." These conditions were not new to the residents of Clover Fork who have lived with the fear of floods for years. But only after the April, 1977 floods did the state grudgingly and officially admit that surface mining contributed to the severity of the flooding, that Harlan County's steep slopes should never have been stripped at all because of the "inability" of the operators to effect reclamation of these hills.

DNREP's shutdown orders against the companies prescribed a host of measures designed to heal the wounds inflicted on the environment by the operators. J & F Coal, for example, was ordered to stop mining, seed all areasof its mine, stabilize all landslides, remove misplaced spoil, clean all debris-laden streams and waterways, and control siltation. The order announced that all this was to be done "immediately," according to a plan to be submitted to and approved by the Department "immediately."

The state, so lax for so long, was now trying to restore its tarnished image. Governor Julian Carroll and DNREP Secretary Robert Bell, who had lobbied against the federal bill, now sought the stance of tough enforcers.

The Department of the Interior and some members of the public may have been fooled by this posturing, but the industry was not.

TO BEGIN WITH, none of the companies that were shut down in October were fined either at that time or when the state later held hearings on the closures—this, despite the tremendous weight of the evidence against them. But far worse than this was the subsequent lack of reclamation which meant that the citizens of Clover Fork and Cranks Creek would continue to be endangered by renewed flooding. As one of them said after October's flood, "We don't sleep too much when it rains. We're packed and ready to go."

At its hearing on October 24, 1977, J & F was ordered to complete its reclamation within ten days. Before the ink dried on this order the coal company asked for an extension. In response the department allowed that it had "no objection to a reasonable extension of time." How much would be reasonable? The department simply asked J & F "please" to "let us know how much additional time" it would need.

Similarly casual treatment was accorded to T & T Darby. Two weeks after T & T was ordered to submit a reclamation plan, it had not done so. This elicited a letter deferentially

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noting that it "would appreciate" notice of how the plan was coming along.

Another two and a half weeks passed. By the Department's own admission on November 9, 1977 T & T (as well as J & D and Dean Trucking) had at that time "performed little or none of the measures indicated in the order." Perhaps T & T could be excused: it was busy, according to the state's records, illegally strip-mining without a permit on another site. Still there were no fines, no enforcement.

The state finally coaxed a plan out of T & T on January 14, 1978. The DNREP bureaucracy, however, did not get round to approving it until March 22, 1978, *more than five months after the original order to submit a reclamation plan "immediately."*

This piece of paper, unfortunately, bore no relationship to what was to happen in the hills above Clover Fork. Put into practice, T & T's "plan" was an abysmal failure. In May, a state inspector found T & T's proposal for removing the silt clogging Clover Fork's tributaries "unfeasible." "The company's equipment," he reported, "sinks down and has to be pulled out by other dozers."

David Rosenbaum, Director of the Department's Division of Water Resources (a division not directly responsible for the strip mining enforcement effort) confirmed this judgment. The T & T foreman responsible for the operation told Rosenbuam that he didn't believe he could clean the nearby channels with the equipment available to him. In fact, the foreman had never met the T & T engineer who had drawn up the reclamation plan and, according to Rosenbaum had only a "vague idea of the work . . . to be performed."

Thus, seven months after the state ordered the "immediate" performance of reclamation, the effort on Clover Fork had degenerated into farcical chaos.

KENTUCKY'S APPALACHIAN citizens find themselves in a situation remarkably similar to that of Southern blacks during the 1960s. Then blacks could expect no justice from their state and local courts, for those tribunals then simply reflected the pattern of the predominant, anti-black power structure. There was then no resort except to the federal courts. It was there that unprejudiced hearings took place, there that the landmark voting rights and segregation cases were fairly decided.

So it will be for Kentuckians. If primary enforcement power over strip-mining is handed over to their state officials, Kentuckians will be forced to depend primarily for the preservation of their lives, property, and environment upon the same officials who have consistently failed the citizenry in the past. The only sensible alternative to this dismal prospect is enforcement of the law by federal officials whose interests are not subject to the persistent political and ecoomic pressures to which local authorities have proven themselves so susceptible. OSM inspectors and lawyers, in this present interim period in which OSM has had regulatory authority, have already shown themselves to be particularly immune to local political pressure. They have not hesitated to order on-the-spot mine shutdowns and to march into federal courts for injunctions against recalcitrant operators. Doubts which have risen within OSM ranks over the choice of strict or lenient enforcement have generally been resolved in favor of strict enforcement.

To grant Kentucky primary enforcement power would be equivalent—as the *Courier-Journal* has tartly editorialized—to putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. If Walter Heine, OSM's Director and a man whose reputation was earned by the strict enforcement of Pennsylvania's strip-mining law, has the slightest doubt that this would inevitably be the case, then perhaps he should spend a rainy morning with Darrell Yother, trudging down a muddy Madlock Hollow Road.

Screen

TALE OF HOFFMAN

KRAMER VS. KRAMER

WHEN MY wife and I got married in the mid-sixties, we used to play touch football on Sunday afternoons with ten other couples. Out of the total of twenty-two people, my wife and I are the only two who are still married to each other. A psychiatrist I know considers this the most flabbergasting statistic he's ever heard. I mention it just so you'll realize that I am one of the few people I know who is *not* the right audience for *An Unmarried Woman, Rich Kids, Starting Over* or *Kramer vs. Kramer*. All these movies are soap operas. The people they're about are the people they're for. Since I have been left out here, maybe I am disqualified from judging them. Yet I do find that there are a few distinctions among them I feel competent to make. For instance, I feel safe in saying that however indistinguishable Robert Benton's *Kramer vs. Kramer* may be in other ways, it at least provides the kind of acting that a slice of life requires. It puts its mouth where its money is.

Gabriel Moran, FSC

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Compare it to *Starting Over*. In the latter, after Burt Reynolds is thrown out by his wife (Candice Bergen), he joins a therapy group for divorced men. The weekly sessions become the movie's sub-plot, and in the spirit engendered by such groups, the movie itself begins to rely more on acting out than acting. In their adaptation of Dan Wakefield's novel, scriptwriter James Brooks and director Alan Pakula have tried to stick to situations that can embody stock emotions. In this kind of dramaturgy, we have to presuppose the feelings the characters have in each scene. All the scene tries to do is be clever in illustrating what we have already guessed.

In a development that's typical, Burt Reynolds and his ricochet romance (Jill Clayburgh) have had a tiff. That they really want to get back together again goes without saying, which is a good thing since they're not speaking. We know the movie will find a way around this obstacle to their relationship; the only question is how. The solution is provided by a fair to benefit the school where she teaches. She volunteers to be the lady who gets dunked in the tank of water at a quarter a pitch, and Reynolds gives her about $5.00 worth of dousings to cool her off. A movie that proceeds in this way is pretty low-caliber fun, like a crossword that makes it easy for us by containing a familiar quotation.

Kramer turns into this kind of dumb show only once, in a scene where the little boy (Justin Henry) is rushed to a hospital to have stitches taken in his eye. No parent can watch this scene without being turned inside out by it. I don't like movies that attack my emotions precisely where they know I'm defenseless. Elsewhere, however, *Kramer* doesn't try to succeed by kinetic art like this. It explores impalpable experiences and relies upon Dustin Hoffman's performance to flesh them out. Ted Kramer is a role made to order for an actor who is an obsessive-compulsive like Hoffman.

Although we think of a Method actor as someone whose submission to his own libido makes him inarticulate, Hoffman is pretty good at explaining himself. "My job is to do you," he says, "and the only way that's possible is if I've got you inside me. I've got to find out what you're doing. Nobody simply *is*, except infants. Once we get self-conscious, we act—all the way to the grave. So an actor shows you how people act." Ted Kramer is an advertising art director who loses his wife Joanna (Meryl Streep) and then loses his job as well. To work up the role, Hoffman scouted out a real advertising art director he could study at close range. The one he got to co-operate had not only lost his job like Ted, but looked like Hoffman himself. Hoffman literally moved into this fellow's office, where he would spend days on end watching how an art director works, speaks, gestures, etc. Hoffman observed this man through two-way mirrors. He even went to his house when the fellow wasn't home and took his clothes to wear in the movie.

One reason this intense prep work was necessary was that Hoffman had to have the character he was playing "inside" himself from the very beginning of the film. That's when Joanna walks out, leaving Ted alone to cope with their son. The most histrionic moment to which Hoffman had to rise occurs only a few scenes into his performance when Kramer explodes with rage and confusion at what his wife has done. It was by coming to *Kramer* straight from the study of a real art director that Hoffman hoped he could project how such a man reacts to a wife's desertion. Part of the embroidery Hoffman put on the tirade this crucial scene contains was to stumble purposely over certain lines. A few transposed words here are as carefully executed, and as important to our understanding of the character, as a pratfall by Chaplin. They show us how completely the self-assurance this character exudes has been undone. The poor guy literally doesn't know what he's saying anymore.

Hoffman's acting is inventive throughout the film. One has to give his performance its due, and Meryl Streep's as well, for although her role is much smaller than his, her acting is commensurate where it needs to be. But I think it's equally important not to give this movie more than its due. The very things that make *Kramer* affecting—its pertinence and timeliness—are also its limitations. Hoffman's statement about getting the character "inside" him so he can "do" the role sounds very authoritative. Powers of observation as keen as his strike us as all the resources an actor would ever need. But how could you use Hoffman's approach to play a really big role—Lear, say, or even Count Dracula, about whom I was speaking in the last issue? Whom would Hoffman go and study to get these characters "inside" him? They are too large to fit in such a small space. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in Hoffman's philosophy, a lot more. To be successful, he has to stay pretty close to home. His performance as *Kramer* has real virtuosity, but virtuosity achieved within a very, very narrow range. The same might be said of the whole movie.

I think that the success *Kramer* is enjoying results from its ability to appeal to both men and women at the same time. It is an outlet for both the self-righteousness that men feel in these situations and the guilt that women feel. Because I've so often had to play the divorce counselor to my friends, I have an unwanted expertise in this area. The man feels he is the aggrieved party because his wife left him even though he had done nothing "wrong." The woman feels guilty because she left her husband or, worse, her children, in order to "find herself." Up to a point both the men and the women crave the pain they are in, which is for each a way to cling a little longer to the wreckage of their marriage—a way to delay sliding down into the icy emotional waters where you are truly on your own and must swim or sink alone.

These feelings are entirely natural, but I don't think that we should therefore admire a movie which panders to them. To do so gives us the illusion of a perspective on our own lives and times which we don't really have. It turns out that *Kramer* is not so different from the other movies in this genre after all. It too is just a session of group therapy, a chance to be reassured that you are not alone with your problems. First there was *An Unmarried Woman*. Next came films, like *Starting Over*, that might have been called *An Unmarried Man*. Now we have *Kramer*, which is *The Unmarried Couple*.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

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Books: COURTMANSHIP & HOW TO PLAY IT

THE BRETHREN

Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong
Simon and Schuster, $13.95, 467 pp.

Isidore Silver

QUICK—which Supreme Court Justice said, upon learning of the death of his "Chief," "This is the first indication I have ever had that there is a God?" This cold, perhaps callous, observation is not to be found in *The Brethren* but rather in Richard Kluger's *Simple Justice*; the speaker was Felix Frankfurter, the unlamented subject was Chief Justice Fred Vinson, and the time was the summer of 1953. So much for Supreme Court secrecy. Of course, *The Brethren* is not a work of history written about events two-and-one-half decades old nor a judicial biography spanning a career, such as Gerald Dunne's recent excellent treatment of Hugo Black ("Old Ego" as some of his colleagues dubbed him); but the "revelations" contained in each are remarkably similar. Of course, the "Woodstrong" effort may be different from the others because it does present ticklish questions of future relations among presently serving justices on the Court. On the basis of the evidence in the book, there should be little strain, since justices' personalities (again, egos) will probably be immune to even the most derisive commentaries, especially to those of their brethren. Undoubtedly, like actors in a Broadway hit assured of a long run despite the fulminations of critics, they will continue to do what they have been doing. The questions are, of course, what are the justices doing, are they doing it well, and what does this book contribute to our knowledge.

To a professional student of the Court, though perhaps not to the public at large (which may be confused by the mass of materials), *The Brethren*'s answers are distressing. Since the book resolutely proclaims itself to be a work of investigative journalism, it of course eschews any perspective—or takes only the most banal of perspectives—on the Court's role. We are ritually informed that "virtually every issue of significance in American society eventually arrives at the Supreme Court." This may have been true in the 1830s (when De Tocqueville observed that in America every social and political question eventually becomes a legal one) and even as late as 1937; but since the "Old Supreme Court" stopped battling the New Deal in that year, the "Modern Court" of the last four decades has largely confined itself to deciding peripheral questions not affecting the distribution of power and wealth within society or shaping fundamental questions of that society's direction. With the arguable exception of the Warren Court's "one man, one vote" and desegregation decisions, there were very few issues of political and economic "significance" tackled by even that robust body. Of course, the Court has handled many important "symbolic" social issues such as defendants' rights and capital punishment, but its concerns here—as well as society's—mask the fact that more fundamental questions are within the domain of either legislative action, social consensus, or, perhaps, merely inertia.

Because of the authors' perspective, the book's suggestion that it is the secrecy of the Court's "deliberative process" (internal debates and negotiations) that accounts for its power to influence public opinion is both illogical and overdrawn. The implication that the Court is the *only* governmental body that deliberates secretly is obviously incorrect as is the notion that such secrecy somehow inordinately affects public opinion; opponents of Supreme Court decisions (as well as defenders) are not particularly concerned with the deliberative process but with the results.

The attempt to "demystify" the Court is not aided by statements such as "The Supreme Court . . . reviews decisions made by both federal courts and state courts. . . ." In the first place, this observation is wrong, since the Court only acts when claims arising under the United States Constitution, federal laws, or treaties are involved. Secondly, such a statement only serves to confirm much public ignorance about the importance of even the Court's official role (an ignorance apparently shared by its present chief justice who once exclaimed, "We are the Supreme Court and we can do what we want"). Of course, building up the Court's importance and mystique is only the necessary prelude to demonstrating that judges are only "human." The evidence for this was abundant long before the authors sat down to write.

If not perspective, what does investigative journalism provide? Well, mostly quotes from internal court memoranda and draft opinions—and comments by loquacious people about other people. Occasionally, the authors' own grasp of legal issues is faulty—as Renata Adler's otherwise churlish review in the *New York Times* deftly pointed out—but the treatment of legal issues in general is good, even excellent, considering the authors' lack of credentials. *What* issues to treat, the sensational ones, the ones containing "good" (i.e. juicy) stories is ultimately a question of perspective and even personal taste. While I might quarrel with some choices—for instance, there is little discussion of one notorious early Burger Court decision, *Harris* v *New York*, a case which dishonestly undermined *Miranda* and which (rightly) caused apoplexy among law professors—I would not substitute my substantive judgments for those of the authors' on a matter which is bound to be controversial.

Another "values" problems arises because of the authors' evident agreement with Justice Stevens's frustration about the "absence of intellectual content or meaningful discussion at conference" and the presence of "pragmatic rather than principled decisions—shading the facts, twisting the law, warping logic to

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reconcile the unreconcilable." The issue of "principle" vs. "pragmatism" is (a) overstated, since there are principles, often buried ones, in even the most pragmatically worked out decisions, and (b) often a "cover" for criticism of the substantive decisions of the Court (as I noted in a Law Review article discussing why some eminent neoconservative critics of the Warren Court had not applied their own professed standards to the Burger Court's often shoddy work product).

The notion that the Court is—or should be—a "court of law" is as impossibly naive as the belief that its decisions (and the means of reaching them) are fundamental to society and to public perceptions about the Court. What might be called the "legal model" implies that the Constitution's few thousand words (mostly general and even hortatory) can be *logically* transmuted into a plethora of specific and obvious principles to be applied to the complex cases that are the essential business of constitutional litigation. This "mechanistic jurisprudence" once constituted the rhetoric by which social welfare legislation was regularly struck down by the "Old Court," and that Courts' ultimate failure can be attributed to a growing recognition, both within and without professional circles, that such jurisprudence was *only* rhetorical and masked a deeper personal and intellectual distaste for remedial legislation. The "law" of the Constitution simply cannot be known or readily ascertained by invocation of vague clauses such as "due process of law."

Yet the Court is not a completely "lawless" body; the language of the Constitution does provide a framework for judgment, a judgment that delicately combines certain broad concerns and prudential appraisals of the current state of public opinions. The Supreme Court justice should be (or think of himself as being) both politicians and statesman as he shifts between the two axes. However well he balances the roles, he will find it difficult to reduce his opinions to neat "legal" formulations. Among the "concerns" suggested by the Constitution itself are (a) basic fairness in government treatment of the individual; (b) equality, or at least some equality, before the law; and (c), most importantly, to the Court at least, preservation of the independence and prerogatives of the judiciary as a check on other branches of government—hence the brethren's vigorous reaction to Nixon's grotesque claims to the right to wiretap domestic radicals without search warrants and to withhold tapes of a criminal conspiracy. Even the most conservative of the Nixon appointees have, with varying emphases, recognized these roles, obviously not as fully as did the Warren Court. (If the Burger Court's "center" really controls that body, as the authors of *The Brethren* claim, then, on some issues, it has moved to the left since 1976, the last year covered by the book.)

We get a fairly good picture of this process from much of *The Brethren*, if not from its naive theory or its sensational excerpts. The justices are men who "role play" both the roles of statesmen and politicians. If Warren Burger did (and does) it badly, then we can be thankful that Harry Blackmun and, perhaps, Lewis Powell do it better. Despite the pettiness, the ego involvements, the vote "politicking" and the personality clashes, it is apparent that most justices take their jobs—if you will, their roles—seriously and are well aware of the world(s) around them. Indeed, it is comforting if not always inspiring to learn that they do not live in an Ivory Tower but understand that their decisions have, as Justice Brennan once put it, "ripples." While there have been few "great" justices (only twelve of the hundred who have served prior to Stevens's appointment in 1975) and none on the present Court, neither have twentieth-century justices been the mindless railroad and corporate lawyers once thought to be the only "eligibles" for a High Court seat.

This has probably been a long and long-winded way of saying that the Court today mirrors rather than shapes society. This follower's role is most vividly demonstrated in the Court's tergiversations on issues such as obscenity and capital punishment, meanderings that reflect public ambivalence on these subjects. Of course, on certain issues such as abortion, a certain "shaping" role may have been played, although it is probably true that "public opinion" rejecting relatively restrictive laws on abortion actually preceded the Court's historic 1973 decisions. Although like all "men" the justices have certain loyalties which prevail over others, their "role" requires adherence to a broad notion of institutional integrity above all—even Burger often worried about being depicted as "Nixon's man," though he did little to dispel the image.

The great difficulty with this book is its lack of insight into the question of how well the Court "role plays" the functions I have mentioned. If "role playing" involves a sort of game, then it is essential that the players *not* perceive it as a game. Like many games, the rules—preservation of institutional integrity among them—are important, if for no other reason than because society feels them to be. Also, this particular game is important because it is essential to our belief that American society is one of "Liberty and Justice for All." Justice

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Rehnquist, who regards opinion-writing as a sort of con game wherein he "cools out the mark" (i.e., some other justice who is the victim of the shill) by cutting back on outrageous language to obtain agreement on something only marginally less outrageous, apparently believes that the judicial function is *only* a game. His cynicism is almost matched, as the book makes clear, by Justice White, although he at least has certain substantive beliefs that comport with notions of fairness and equality. While *The Brethren* amply describes the processes by which the game is played, it fails to analyze them well or, indeed, even to comment upon the nature of the game and precisely why it is so important.

In need of critical judgment

WALKER PERCY
An American Search
Robert Coles
Little,Brown, $12.50, 250 pp.

Thomas LeClair

WALKER PERCY and Robert Coles, though men of great learning, have for many years fought the tyranny of analysis, the dissolving of individual, concrete, time-bound experience into the analytic categories of psychologists, sociologists and philosophers. Robert Coles lets the people in the *Children of Crisis* books talk; he allows them their lives. The best of Walker Percy's novels have a mysterious particularity that resists the names—"Southern," "Catholic," "Existential"—that would familiarize the books. Even Percy's essays have an engaging inconclusiveness. It is his refusal to transform, to substitute concepts for consciousness, that drew Coles to Percy's fiction. But in attempting to write a non-imperial "response" to Percy's work, Coles has produced a book generous in intention but finally not worthy of its subject.

Walker Percy is what Wallace Stevens called "The impossible possible philosophers' man,/The man who has had the time to think enough,/The central man. . . ." While doing residency in pathology at New York's Bellevue Hospital in 1941, Percy contracted tuberculosis and spent the next four years recovering, reading philosophy, thinking. Percy moved back to the South and took up as his full-time occupation thinking some more. During the middle 1950s he wrote essays on philosophy, linguistics and culture for a number of magazines including *Commonweal*. In 1961 *The Moviegoer* was published and won the National Book Award. Since then Percy has published three other novels—*The Last Gentleman, Love in the Ruins* and *Lancelot*—and a collection of essays, *The Message in the Bottle*.

Percy is "the central man" because he has set down his consciousness among the largest issues of our time: religious loss, cultural conflict, alienation, apocalypse. Coles calls Percy's thirty years of thinking about these subjects "An American Search," but I think exploration is more precise. Percy thinks of himself as a Martian wandering over and wondering about the surface of our Earth. In his best fiction, *The Moviegoer* and *The Last Gentleman*, Percy allows his attentive consciousness a freedom to gather multiple specimens of our strange, death-haunted, death-defying U.S.A. When he is more purposeful, as he is in *Love in the Ruins* and *Lancelot*, the knowledge of lives that characterizes his earlier work turns into understanding of life, exploration becomes edification.

Although Percy is an important writer of uneven quality, Coles does not want to judge and does not want to do the kind of literary analysis that would allow him to judge, to discriminate among Percy's works. Coles's primary methods are summary and quotation. They are adequate, even admirable, for the humane sociologist or psychiatrist, but these methods simplify rather than honor the complexity of art. Coles's profile of Percy the man, composed of long passages from interviews and Coles's observations, and his chapters on Percy's philosophical background and essays are

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excellent. But the novels deserve a thoroughness, subtlety and, finally, critical judgment Coles is either unwilling or unable to provide. If Percy's fiction has been "over-analyzed," as Coles claims, the best of it refuses certainty and recovers itself. The way Coles describes it, Percy's fiction doesn't have the intricacy and originality that would support—and ultimately defy—analysis.

To avoid the pseudo-objectivity of criticism, Coles writes as a "spiritual kinsman," a man on a parallel track. But in his concern to avoid a critical takeover of Percy's texts, Coles forgets who his reader might be. To get through the background, the first half of the book, the reader would have to know Percy's novels, yet when Coles discusses the novels he writes as though the reader was not familiar with them. Again, in whatever guise, it's the expert up front.

To succeed in the kind of admiring response that Coles chooses, one should, as Roland Barthes does, speak *in* as well as *about* the texts. Coles knows one of Percy's languages—the language of existential psychiatry—but Percy has other tongues Coles does not hear or speak. For all of its enthusiasm and respect, *Walker Percy: An American Search* is curiously monaural. Reading it, one comes to appreciate more fully Percy's artistic achievement because it has exceeded the grasp of an intelligent and sympathetic critic.

Out-Americaning the Americans

THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS

Leonard J. Arrington and Davis Bitton

Alfred A. Knopf, $15, 404 pp.

Peter W. Williams

MORMONS are hard to think about. Recently when a colleague called me and asked whether Mormons were Protestant or not, I had to hedge. As Will Herberg pointed out some years ago, Americans generally think of themselves and of others in terms of their membership, active or otherwise, in the Protestant, Catholic or Jewish communities. For Mormons, the answer would seem to be "none of the above." They are, in short, "bad to think" since they elude easy classification and, until recent changes in the world's connotation, were often lumped together with Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses as "cults."

Mormons are bad to think for other reasons as well. A few years ago, I was sitting on my front porch on a very hot July afternoon, and spotted two young men with short hair, narrow black ties, and white shirts with long sleeves rolled down and buttoned. I knew what was coming, and was glad that an impending appointment was there to save me from the earnest felt-board lecture and testimonial which loomed ahead. Here was American middle-class Evangelical culture—what Martin Marty has called "*Reader's Digest* religion"—apotheosized. But, strangely enough, they were not really Evangelical, and were most likely emissaries from the state-Kingdom of Salt Lake City which seems as remote in its way as its alien neighbors, Las Vegas and Reno.

Mormons, in short, have built a culture on out-Americaning the Americans and out-Protestanting the Protestants. Especially if our exposure to Mormonism comes at second-hand, most of us probably associate the Latter-Day Saints, as they are more properly called, with materialist theology, a simplistic moralism, an implausible supernatural

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history, and, perhaps most vividly, a highly unattractive version of right-wing politics. (''Jack-Mormons'' such as the Udalls are rule-proving exceptions.)

The authors of this new and comprehensive history of the Mormon experience in America are both practicing Latter-Day Saints, and are concerned not so much with refuting as with qualifying this stereotyped ''Gentile'' picture of Mormonism. True, Mormons have often (but not always) been anti-intellectual. True, Mormons have often (but not always) been anti-feminist (not to mention polygamous). True, Mormons have often (but not always) identified with ''conservative'' political social and economic positions. True, Joseph Smith's remarkable revelations are difficult to verify historically (but they are equally difficult to disprove). In short, what we have here is an attempt by a team of quite liberal ''insider'' historians to present a sympathetic yet critical picture of Mormon life and history intended to modify the views both of the hostile outsider and the overly credulous initiate.

To a large degree, Arrington and Bitton succeed in these aims. *The Mormon Experience* is for the most part balanced and scholarly, yet easily accessible to the general reader. It suffers as well as benefits from its joint authorship, however, in that the narrative often strays into the specialties of one author or the other—the parts on economic and agronomic developments tend to read like catalogues—and the two final chapters, with intriguing titles' like ''Group Personality,'' tend toward incoherent hodgepodges having little to do with their titles' promises.

Were I asked to recommend one book on Mormonism for the general reader, I would hesitate between *The Mormon Experience* and the late Thomas F. O'Dea's *The Mormons* (1957). Arrington and Bitton have the advantages of being judicious insiders, practicing historians, and writers whose perspectives are informed by the issues of our own day. Their chapter on ''Mormon Sisterhood,'' for example, is obviously a result of the challenge of contemporary feminism to historiography, and their discussion of the roles of Mormon women draws on new sources to challenge successfully the stereotype of the eternally quiescent female Saint. On the other hand, the insights and information which O'Dea, a sympathetic

REVIEWERS

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

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Catholic sociologist, managed to provide in often more coherent form keeps his work fresh and accessible. Whichever way one turns for information, though, the *Commonweal* reader will find some acquaintance with the Mormon experience relevant as a case study in the growth of a "popular" religion, often highly unpopular with the general public, which has emerged to "respectable" status and in which the conflict between authoritarianism and obscurantism and more progressive standpoints recently developing sounds awfully familiar.

Failure and creativity

GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS

Paddy Kitchen

Atheneum, $10.95, 000 pp.

J. A. Appleyard

HOPKINS tests the limits of biography. The Oxford graduate, convert, poet, Jesuit priest, classics teacher lived from 1844 to 1889, well into the era when lives have been amply documented and memorialized.

But Hopkins is a special case. His life was short and externally uneventful, though that might be said of many literary figures. A large part of it was affected, so far as public record is concerned, by being lived in a religious institution, so that much has to be inferred about his life from its life. Worse yet, his poems were known to few in his lifetime and were published only thirty years after his death, so there was little reason for attention, correspondence, critical discussion, or reminiscence, beyond what friends give each other. And were it not for the devotion of one friend, the poet Robert Bridges, there would be little to say about Hopkins.

Still, the very problems create a challenge to the biographer. How did the first-rate poetry, the sensuously vivid language and the radical energetic rhythms, emerge from the studious and disciplined life of seminary and classroom? And, once it existed, how could Hopkins not have published it, could have so long resisted in fact Bridges's efforts to find an audience for it? And what of the wreck of Hopkins's life, the succession of failures as preacher and teacher, and the tempting conclusion that his vocations as Jesuit and poet never fitted, perhaps never could have fitted?

The biographer who wants to tackle these questions has scanty material to work with: Hopkins's sporadic journals, some sermons and devotional writings, and his letters, which are chiefly to Bridges and to Richard Dixon, a clergyman poet unjustly neglected, Hopkins thought, by the public.

Paddy Kitchen (she is a British novelist and a biographer of Patrick Geddes) has assembled this material into a readable narrative. She has a novelist's sense of how to put characters into contexts and sketch a setting. She is particularly good on the atmosphere of the Oxford of Jowett, Pater & Pusey. The familiar themes are all here: Hopkins's conversion under Newman's influence, the destruction of his early poetry and the decision not to write any more of it when he entered the Jesuits, the influence of the *Spiritual Exercises* and the long years of Jesuit training, the evolution of the ideas of "inscape" and "instress" in his journals, the abrupt return to poetry with the astonishing virtuosity of *The Wreck of the Deutschland*, its subsequent rejection when it was submitted to the Jesuit journal *The Month*, the paradoxical mixture of job failure and poetic creativity that marked Hopkins's later years, the final tortured sonnets, his death of typhoid at Dublin while he was an overworked reader of exams in what remained of the university Newman founded.

On two points the reader should be warned. A *leitmotif* of the book is what Kitchen calls "the conflict between sensuality and purity," and every imaginable sexual overtone, every implication of sexual repression, is assiduously explored. The Victorians invite this sort of thing, I suppose, Hopkins perhaps more so than others because of his preoccupation with physical beauty and spiritual ecstasy, but Kitchen's treatment is reductive and depressing in its repetitiveness—as though one could see in Leopold Bloom only the ogling, farts and lubricious fantasies, and none of the patience, thoughtfulness and love.

The other weakness of the book is related to this reductiveness, and shows very clearly the limits of Hopkins as a biographical subject. When it comes to assessing the last years of his life, and the meaning of his intense suffering and paradoxical creativity, we simply do not know enough about what he thought and

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experienced, to go beyond what the poetry itself tells us. Unless, that is, we construct an interpretive schema for his whole life, one that is large enough to encompass the mystic's suffering and the mystic's hope. Kitchen's treatment of the late Hopkins is spare and factual, just where you want it to pull things together and give a point of view. The man who called himself "Time's eunuch" and, in the same last year of his life, "immortal diamond," and who said on his deathbed "I am so so happy," eludes Kitchen's grasp. The reader who wants to understand *this* Hopkins would do better to look at John Pick's biography of almost forty years ago.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 66)

Chrysler's function in our society is to provide jobs, not cars.

Our unthinking acceptance of the job as a basic unit of wealth may prove our undoing. The job's desiderata—cash, credit, status, self-respect, a chance to solve problems, use tools, interact with others, participate in processes with goals—have been provided in many other ways by many other societies. The job *need* not be a basic unit of wealth in *any* society and *ought* not be one in an industrial society, lest it choke on its own production, no matter who owns the means, and lose its social power to evolve.

What we would do without jobs, without making cars or munitions or mining asbestos or uranium, and how we would live are genuine questions, not unanswerable objections to any fundamental change. If we get too lazy and fail to answer them, we may fail altogether, like the dinosaur: through sheer lack of imagination.

BARBARA FRANCIS

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

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